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ENGLISH SUMMARY 
Sustainable sourcing has been on the purchasing and supply chain 
management research agenda for more than a decade and is among the most 
popular topics in the field today. Meanwhile, companies have developed a 
range of methods and tools for managing sustainable sourcing, which has 
grown to be an integrated part of purchasing strategy. Both in practice and in 
the sustainable-sourcing literature, we still see examples of these methods not 
always having the desired effect. In particular, we see that the most common 
method of assessment-based sustainability-governance structure with 
governance mechanisms such as codes of conduct, certificates, and 
monitoring is used on a large scale, and often results in a lack of supplier 
sustainability compliance. This Ph.D. dissertation aims to explore and expand 
knowledge about the causes underlying this lack of supplier compliance. The 
focus is on suppliers’ perception of buying companies’ used assessment-based 
methods and how these affect the supplier–buyer relationship and hence the 
suppliers’ ability toward sustainability compliance. 
 
The following two research problems are addressed throughout this paper-
based dissertation: 
 
Research Problem 1: What governance structures and governance 
mechanisms are used by buying companies to 
achieve supplier sustainability compliance and 
how do these governance structures affect 
suppliers’ sustainability compliance? 
 
Research Problem 2: How do suppliers perceive the present 
sustainability related governance structures and 
governance mechanisms utilized by buying 
companies and what impact do the 
sustainability governance structures and 
governance mechanisms have on the buyer-
supplier relationship? 
 
The theoretical background of the dissertation is sustainable-sourcing theory, 
transaction cost theory, and aspects of social exchange theory. These aspects 
deal with the concepts of relational norms and distributive justice, which 
relate to the underlying mechanisms that can affect the relationship between 
buyer and supplier, thus sustainability supplier compliance. 
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The empirical basis for this dissertation is 30 interviews conducted in India, 
Bangladesh, and China. These qualitative data were collected using 
semistructured interviews with suppliers, where the respondents were fabric 
owners or managers. The qualitative approach was chosen due to the design 
of the research problems and the explorative approach to suppliers’ 
perceptions, as this approach allows you to get the respondents’ opinions on 
the subject. This provides the knowledge and insight necessary to understand 
the challenges seen for suppliers in connection with the sustainability-related 
requirements from the buying companies. 
 
The dissertation contributes to the sustainable-sourcing literature by giving an 
overview of the governance structures used by the buying companies and the 
associated governance mechanisms used. At the same time, the dissertation 
provides an overview of what works and what does not work. Furthermore, a 
contribution is given by an insight into the underlying mechanisms that may 
contribute to suppliers’ ability and the potential for sustainability compliance. 
By examining these underlying mechanisms as distributive justice and 
relational norms in relation to the assessment-based governance structure, the 
dissertation contributes to sustainable-sourcing literature as this has not been 
done previously. Moreover, the dissertation shows that suppliers’ perception 
of distributive justice and relational norms affects the relationship, which can 
be a cause of suppliers’ lack of sustainability compliance. 
 
Based on the above, buying-company managers are advised to take aspects 
such as equity and norms into consideration when requiring sustainability 
compliance of their suppliers. At the same time, by closer cooperation and 
stronger relationship, they must, together with suppliers, agree on their mutual 
expectations. 
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DANSK RESUME 
Sustainable sourcing har været på dagsordenen indenfor indkøb og supply 
chain management i mere end et årti og er blandt de mest populære emner 
indenfor feltet i dag. Samtidig har virksomheder udviklet en lang række 
metoder og værktøjer for netop at gennemføre sustainable sourcing, hvilket 
samtidig er blevet en integreret del af virksomhedernes indkøbsstrategi. Vi ser 
stadig eksempler på metoder som ikke altid har den ønskede effekt både i 
praksis og i sustainable sourcing litteraturen. Især ser vi, at den mest anvendte 
metode, evaluerings-baseret sustainability governance med governance 
mekanismer som codes of conduct, certifikater og monitorering er hyppigt 
anvendt og ofte resulterer i manglende overholdelse af sustainability fra 
leverandørernes side. Denne Ph.d. afhandling har til formål, at udforske og 
udvide viden om årsagerne bag denne manglende leverandør overholdelse. 
Fokus er på leverandørernes opfattelse af købervirksomhedernes anvendte 
evalueringsbaserede metoder og på hvordan disse påvirker leverandør-køber 
relationen og dermed leverandørernes evne til at overholde sustainability 
relaterede krav. 
 
De følgende forskningsspørgsmål indgår i afhandlingen: 
 
• Hvilke governance strukturer og governance mekanismer er anvendt 
af køber virksomhederne for at opnå leverandørernes overholdelse af 
sustainability relaterede krav og hvordan påvirker disse governance 
strukturer leverandørernes evne til overholdelse af sustainability 
krav? 
 
• Hvordan opfatter leverandørerne de nuværende sustainability 
relaterede governance strukturer og governance mekanismer anvendt 
af køber virksomhederne og hvilken påvirkning har de sustainability 
governance strukturer og governance mekanismer på køber-
leverandør relationen? 
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Den teoretiske baggrund for afhandlingen er hhv. sustainable sourcing teori, 
transaktionsomkostningsteori og aspekter indenfor social exchange teorien. 
Disse aspekter omhandler begreberne relational norms og distributive justice, 
som relaterer til de bagvedliggende mekanismer, som kan påvirke relationen 
mellem køber og leverandør og dermed leverandørernes evne til at overholde 
de sustainability relaterede krav som stilles af køber virksomhederne. 
Afhandlingens konklusion bygger på 30 interviews foretaget i hhv. Indien, 
Bangladesh og Kina. Denne kvalitative data blev indsamlet ved hjælp af semi-
strukturerede interviews med leverandører hvor respondenterne var 
virksomhedsejere eller ledere. Den kvalitative tilgang er valgt grundet 
udformningen af forskningsspørgsmålene og den explorative tilgang i 
forbindelse med leverandørernes holdninger, da den netop giver mulighed for, 
at høre respondenternes meninger om emnet. Herved opnås den viden  og 
indsigt som er nødvendig for at kunne konkluderer med hensyn til de 
udfordringer der ligger for leverandørerne i forbindelse med de sustainability 
relaterede krav som køber virksomhederne stiller. 
 
Afhandlingen bidrager til sustainable sourcing litteraturen ved, at give et 
overblik over de governance strukturer som anvendes af køber virksomheder 
samt de tilhørende governance mekanismer. Samtidig med gives der et 
overblik over, hvad der virker og hvad der ikke virker. Yderligere bidrager 
afhandlingen med en indsigt i de mekanismer som kan være medvirkende til 
bidrage til leverandørernes evne og muligheder for sustainability compliance. 
Ved  at undersøge bagved liggende mekanismer som distributive justice og 
relationelle normer i forhold til den evalueringsbaserede governance struktur 
som køber virksomhederne anvender, bidrager afhandlingen til sustainable 
sourcing litteraturen, da dette ikke tidligere er gjort. Desuden viser 
afhandlingen, at leverandørernes opfattelse af distributive justice og 
relationelle normer påvirker relationen hvilket kan være en årsag til 
leverandørernes manglende overholdelse af de sustainability relaterede krav. 
 
Baseret på ovenstående rådes køber virksomhedernes ledere til at tage 
aspekter som retfærdighed og normer med i deres overvejleser når de kræver 
overholdelse af sustainbility relaterede krav af deres leverandører. Samtidig 
bør de forstå, at ved et tættere samarbejde og gennem stærkere relation skal 
de sammen med leverandørerne blive enige og deres fælles forventninger og 
tage mere ansvar i forhold til leverandørerne.
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A PAPER BASED THESIS 
 
This is a paper based thesis based on the scientific papers listed below. The 
four papers are made available to the assessment committee. Co-author 
statement is also made available to the assessment committee and to the 
Faculty as a part of the assessment of the thesis.  
 
The following four papers are included in the dissertation: 
 
Paper 1: Normann, U., (2013), “What are Buying Companies Doing to 
Influence Suppliers to Act Sustainable?”. Extended version of 
Paper presented at the 18th IFPSM Summer School, Salzburg, 
Austria. 
 
Paper 2: Normann, U., (2015), “Sustainability Exchange Governance in 
the Textile and Apparel Industry – “Why Do Suppliers Find It 
Hard to Comply with Buying Companies Sustainability 
Requirements?”. Paper presented at the 24th Annual IPSERA 
Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
 
Paper 3: Normann, U., Ellegaard, C. and Møller, M. M. (2016),  
“Supplier Perceptions of Distributive Justice in Sustainable 
Apparel Sourcing”. Conditional accept with International 
Journal of Physical distribution and Logistics Management. 
Earlier version presented at 31st IMP conference, Kolding, 
Denmark  
 
Paper 4: Normann, U. (2016), “Inconsistent Norms in Buyer-Supplier 
Relations – A Study of Sustainability Introduction in the Textile 
and Apparel Industry”. Paper presented at the 32nd Annual IMP 
Conference in Poznan, Poland. Invited to Industrial Marketing 
Management special issue 2017 – rejected after 1st round review. 
Excerpts accepted as contribution to the book “Sustainable 
Operations management – new perspectives”. Edited by Poul 
Houman Andersen and Luitzen de Boer. To be published 
2018 by  Palgrave MacMillan
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty years, myriad stories have emerged regarding improper 
working conditions and environmental and safety violations in many of the 
world’s industries, and many companies have been and remain the focus of 
media attention around sustainability issues. 
 
“The clothing company Gap made 
a declaration publishing a 
shocking ‘social responsibility’ 
report that revealed terrible 
working conditions in its factories 
in Mexico, China, Russia and 
India” (The Independent 2005). 
 
 
According to a National Labor 
Committee (2006) report, an 
estimated 200 children, some 11 
years old or even younger, are 
sewing clothing for Hanes, Wal-
Mart, J.C. Penney, and Puma at the 
Harvest Rich factory in 
Bangladesh (Institute for Global 
Labour and Human Rights 2006). 
 
 
“Swedish fashion chain H&M 
worked with clothing factories 
in Myanmar where children as 
young as 14 toiled for more than 
12 hours a day” (The Guardian 
2016). 
 
 
“Around 150 Chinese workers at 
Apple manufacturer Foxconn, the 
world’s largest electronics 
manufacturer, threatened to 
commit suicide by leaping from 
their factory roof in protest of their 
working conditions” 
(The Telegraph 2012). 
 
“More than 100 people died 
Saturday and Sunday in a fire at a 
garment factory outside 
Dhaka, Bangladesh” (The New 
York Times 2012). 
 
“The Rana Plaza factory collapse 
was the worst garment disaster in 
history, leaving 1,129 dead and 
many hundreds with devastating 
injuries, including lost limbs” 
(The Guardian 2013b). 
 
“Textiles leave one of the largest 
water footprints on the planet and 
dyeing poses an especially big 
problem” (The Guardian 2013a).
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Such exposure has pushed companies to increase their efforts to meet 
requirements for proper social and environmental conditions, and the pressure 
on manufacturing organizations to adopt benign processes and develop 
greener products has increased significantly around the world over the last 
decade (Vachon 2007). Sustainable development is of growing interest, as 
managers are forced to deal with social and environmental issues, not only for 
their own firms, but also related to their supply chain partners (Vachon & 
Klassen 2006). This growing interest has also moved sustainable supply chain 
management (SSCM) in the past two decades from being a fringe topic to the 
mainstream (Pagell & Shevchenko 2014). The growing interest in and need 
for sustainability in the supply chain, along with the obvious problems that 
come with sustainability compliance, are the starting points of this thesis. 
 
1.1. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
Sustainable supply chain management is part of supply chain and purchasing 
management. It is recognized that the purchasing function already holds a 
strategically important position in companies, and this importance has led to 
an increasing recognition of the role of purchasing, which has evolved and 
expanded from ‘‘buying’’ to ‘‘procurement’’ and ‘‘supply management’’ 
(Paulraj et al. 2006). Furthermore, the purchasing function is an important 
contributor to the strategic success of the company and contributes to the 
sustainable competitive advantage (Ellram & Carr 1994; Mol 2003). With the 
buying company situated at the center, a supply chain encompasses both the 
customer side and supply side. The buyer–supplier dyad forms the core of the 
supply side and is of fundamental importance to the effective integration of 
supply chain activities (Paulraj et al. 2006). This contribution of the 
purchasing function to a sustainable competitive advantage and to the 
company's strategic success depends to a great extent on the company's ability 
to achieve the sustainability compliance demanded from the external 
environment (i.e. stakeholders such as NGOs and customers), and is also 
important for avoiding the above-mentioned media attention. 
 
This growing strategic importance of sustainability in the up-stream supply 
chain is also reflected in research in the sourcing and supply chain 
management (SCM) fields. The number of articles dealing with subjects 
connected to sustainability sourcing, sustainable supply chain management, 
green supply chain management, etc., have soared in recent years (Beske et 
al. 2014; Fahimnia et al. 2015; Govindan et al. 2015; Tachizawa & Wong 
2014). Much of this research deals with whether or not the various initiatives 
around sustainability actually lead to compliance, and which initiatives have 
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the best success. As examples non-compliance are continuously shown in the 
media, the research also shows that many of the mechanisms used by buying 
companies to lead suppliers to sustainability compliance have failed to 
achieve the desired effects (Blowfield 2005; Egels-Zandén 2007; Vachon & 
Klassen 2006). 
 
Generally, most of the purchasing and supply management research has 
focused on the buyer perspective, the network, or the dyadic relationship, 
whereas research with a supplier perspective has been limited (Spina et al. 
2013). The same is true in the sustainable purchasing and supply management 
field, where suppliers have rarely been investigated (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013; 
Seuring & Müller 2008b). In relation to the stakeholders that affect 
sustainability requirements, such as NGOs and the media, suppliers are also 
very important stakeholders in that they have a decisive effect on corporate 
strategy and firm operations (Freeman 1984). The suppliers play a key role 
when buying companies aim to increase sustainability, but less is understood 
about the implications of suppliers trying to meet the sustainability 
requirements of buying companies (Brindley & Oxborrow 2014; Seuring & 
Müller 2008a). 
 
1.2. EMPIRICAL MOTIVATION 
 
The empirical motivation for this thesis stems from my past involvement and 
present interest in the apparel and textile industry. This industry has 
experienced significant environmental problems linked to production 
processes, which are characterized by intense use of chemicals and natural 
resources, resulting in a high environmental impact. Moreover, the search for 
low production costs has led to the relocation of production facilities to the 
Far East, bringing consequences such as challenges with working conditions, 
and also transport-related increases in energy consumption (Caniato et al. 
2012). Another empirical motivation is my employment with VIA Design, an 
educational institution focused on this specific industry, and which funded 
this study. Therefore, the data for the thirty cases covered in this thesis were 
collected in the textile and apparel industry. 
 
1.3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
 
This thesis is focused on the sustainable sourcing process between the buying 
company and the supplier. To broaden the knowledge in the field beyond a 
primarily buyer focus, the research largely focuses on the perceptions of 
suppliers. More specifically, it focuses on three objectives within sustainable 
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sourcing, which, when combined, constitute the overall objective of the thesis. 
The objectives are: 
 
• To explore what efforts are made by buying companies in their 
relationship with suppliers to achieve sustainability compliance, and 
to explore the effect of these efforts. 
 
• To explore why a large proportion of suppliers struggle to meet the 
requirements stipulated by buying companies around sustainability 
compliance, and to explain the underlying mechanisms that may 
cause this struggle. 
 
• To explain the significance of the buyer-supplier relationship in the 
sustainable sourcing process. 
 
The aim of this study is to contribute to an understanding of the structures and 
mechanisms that affect the buyer-supplier relationship, thus providing an 
overview of possible causes for the suppliers’ inability to comply with buying 
companies’ sustainability requirements. 
1.3.1. RESEARCH PROBLEMS 
 
The term research problem refers to the overall issue addressed in the thesis, 
which the research will seek to answer with its overall conclusion. The more 
specific concept of research question is applied in the individual papers, 
where specific delimited issues will be explored and explained. The two 
overall research problems under examination are: 
Research Problem 1: What governance structures and governance 
mechanisms are used by buying companies to 
achieve supplier sustainability compliance and 
how do these governance structures affect 
suppliers’ sustainability compliance? 
 
Research Problem 2: How do suppliers perceive the present 
sustainability related governance structures and 
governance mechanisms utilized by buying 
companies and what impact do the 
sustainability governance structures and 
governance mechanisms have on the buyer-
supplier relationship? 
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The aim of the first research problem is to gain an overview of the literature 
on governance structures and governance mechanisms used by buying 
companies to achieve supplier sustainability compliance. The second research 
problem is addressed by applying concepts from Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) and governance theory. Furthermore, relational and social exchange 
theories are applied by using the concepts relational norms and distributive 
justice to elaborate on suppliers’ perception of sustainability compliance 
requirements. Relational and supplier development theories are utilized to 
clarify how the applied sustainability governance structure has an impact on 
the supplier sustainability compliance. 
Figure 1 illustrates the links between the broad objective and aim of the thesis. 
 
 
Figure 1: The overall links between the objective and the aim of the thesis. 
 
 
To answer the two research problems, four papers are presented; they include  
papers presented at international conferences and papers submitted to peer-
reviewed journals (with one conditional acceptance). The empirical portion of 
the dissertation is elaborated and analyzed in the four papers. Table 1 shows 
the links between the research questions posed in the four papers and the two 
overall research problems of the thesis. The content of the four papers is 
presented in greater detail in Chapter 4.
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Table 1: The links between the papers and the research problems. 
 
Paper 1.  
RQ: What mechanisms do buying companies 
adopt to manage supplier sustainability and 
how do they affect supplier sustainability 
performance? 
 
 
 
                                   Research problem 1. 
 
 
Paper 2. 
RQ: Why do suppliers find it hard to comply 
with buying companies’ sustainability 
requirements? 
 
 
 
  Research problem 2. 
 
  
Paper 3. 
RQ 1: Do suppliers perceive distributive 
injustice when their most important 
customers use assessment to govern their 
sustainable sourcing initiatives? 
 
RQ 2: How do the different perceived costs, 
rewards, and investments of the perceived 
equity equation combine to form overall 
supplier impressions of inequity? 
 
 
 
 
 
Research problem 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper 4. 
RQ: What is the set of norms present in the 
textile and apparel industry and how has 
this norm set developed over time 
 
 
Research problem 2. 
 
  
 
The two concepts of structures and mechanisms are used in two different 
contexts in the thesis. First, governance structures may be defined as 
institutional arrangements that govern exchange by controlling opportunism 
(Dyer 1996). They can be formal or informal and they vary with the 
characteristics of the exchange (Palay 1984). Governance mechanisms, on the 
other hand, refer to practices used by companies to manage relationships 
(Gimenez & Sierra 2013). Second, the terms are used in the methodological 
approach (Chapter 3) here both concepts are important when we are dealing 
with the philosophical direction of critical realism, where structures and 
mechanisms refer to object structures, and causal powers and liabilities, 
respectively (Easton, 2010). Furthermore, the concepts control-based 
governance and assessment-based governance are used interchangeably in 
this dissertation. 
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1.4. ABBREVIATIONS  
 
The following abbreviations are used in the thesis: 
 
BSCI: The Business Social Compliance Initiative 
 
COC: Codes of Conduct 
 
CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
GOTS: Global Organic Textile Standard 
 
GSCM: Green Supply Chain Management 
 
ILO: International Labor Organization 
 
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization 
 
RDS: Responsible Down Standard 
 
RET: Relational Exchange Theory 
 
RP(s): Research Problem(s) 
 
RQ(s): Research Question(s) 
 
SCM: Supply Chain Management 
 
SEDEX: Supplier Ethical Data Exchange 
 
SET: Social Exchange Theory 
 
SSCM: Sustainable Supply Chain Management 
 
TCE: Transaction Cost Economic 
 
TBL: Triple Bottom Line  
 
WCED: World Commission on Environment and Development 
 
WRAP: Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production 
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1.5. READER’S GUIDE 
 
The thesis is divided into four parts, and the aim of this reader’s guide is to 
provide an overview. The content of the thesis is illustrated graphically in 
Figure 2. 
 
The initial part introduces the study and its context, and presents the 
theoretical foundation of the thesis. The theory chapter is separated into three 
parts: sustainability sourcing, governance and relational exchange, and 
relationship development. Each part concerns one of the main theoretical 
themes that form the basis of this thesis. 
 
The second part presents the methodology and the approach used in the study. 
This part present and justifies the philosophical positioning of the study, the 
research approach and design, the description of the unit of analysis, how 
cases are identified and selected, and the overall method of data analysis. 
 
The third part contains a short summary of each of the included papers. Full-
text versions of the papers are omitted from the publicly available thesis to 
avoid any copyright violations. 
 
The fourth and final part concludes the thesis by presenting the discussion and 
conclusion based on the findings of the papers and the overall conceptual 
background. Managerial implications as well as the academic contribution are 
outlined at the end. 
 
Part 1                          
Ø Introduction 
Ø Research objectives 
Ø Theoretical foundation      
Part 2 
Ø Methodology 
 
Part 3 
Ø Summary of papers 
 
Part 4 
Ø Discussion 
Ø Conclusion 
Figure 2: Illustration of the reader's guide
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL 
FOUNDATION 
This chapter presents an overview of the theoretical positioning and analytical 
framework of the project. The sustainability focus of this project is limited to 
sustainability within a buyer-supplier exchange relationship. The chapter is 
divided into three sections to support the overall objective of the thesis: 
sustainable sourcing, governance and relational exchange, and relationship 
development. 
 
The first section of the chapter will provide an overview of the literature on 
sustainability in the sourcing and supplier context, including insights into 
typical sustainability focused governance structures, as well as their effects 
on buyer-supplier exchange. 
 
As shown in the literature review paper (Paper 1), the governance structure 
and its applied mechanisms play an important role in the buyer-supplier 
exchange.  The second section of the chapter therefore clarifies the concept of 
governance in accordance with the transaction cost economic perspective 
(TCE). TCE has emerged as a common framework for understanding how 
managers craft governance arrangements (Poppo & Zenger 2002); it is used 
in this project to analyze the sustainability related exchange regulated by 
buying companies. An extension of the relational governance perspective is 
also outlined. 
 
The third section of this chapter underpins the objective of the thesis by 
explaining how exchanges and relationships between buyer and supplier can 
develop to move toward sustainability compliance. However, we first need to 
understand some of the structures and mechanisms that may affect the 
relationship, thus impacting suppliers’ sustainability compliance. Basic 
relationship theory will be outlined, together with perspectives of the norm 
concept from relational exchange theory (RET), and perspectives from social 
exchange theory (SET) in the form of distributive justice. Some highly 
recognized relationship and relationship development models are included to 
emphasize the importance of sustainability related supplier development. 
Finally, a theoretical recap of relationship development is provided. 
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Figure 3: The theoretical framework of the thesis. 
 
2.1. SUSTAINABLE SOURCING  
 
Over the years, growing competition, as well as an emphasis on efficiency, 
cost reduction, and satisfying consumer demand have increased the strategic 
importance of the purchasing function. A new aspect of purchasing has also 
been developed—that of contributing to a decreased impact on the 
environment and enhanced human rights, social climate and working 
conditions (Cruz 2013; Green et al. 1996; Zsidisin & Siferd 2001). Pressure 
from consumers, NGOs, and local communities, as well as from new 
legislation and regulations, has had a large effect on companies. Sourcing 
from a global supply base exposes buying companies to greater risk stemming 
from supplier irresponsibility in terms of violation of ethical, social and 
environmental standards; this risk therefore requires active management 
(Craighead et al. 2007; Reuter et al. 2010). Many buying companies are 
implementing programs and developing strategies within their supply chains 
aimed at ensuring that suppliers act in a socially and environmentally 
acceptable way and fostering the willingness of suppliers to take part in social 
and environmental supply chain initiatives (Boyd et al. 2007; Caniëls et al. 
2013). These programs and strategies have made sustainability a prominent 
topic within the field of purchasing and supply chain management, and several 
streams of literature cover the role of sustainability. The most widely-adopted 
definition of sustainability is that of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development: 
 
Sustainability is “development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (WCED 
1987, p. 8). 
 
This macroeconomic definition, however, is difficult to apply and provides 
little guidance for organizations (Hart 1995; Starik & Rands 1995). The triple 
bottom line (TBL) in Figure 4 is a central concept that helps to operationalize 
sustainability, where a minimum level of performance is to be achieved in the 
environmental, economic and social dimensions (Seuring and Müller 2008). 
Sustainable	
sourcing	and	
sustainability	
governance
Market	and	
relational	
governance
Relational	
exchanges	and	
development
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Figure 4: The triple bottom line by Carter & Rogers (2008). 
 
One of the major areas in the field of sourcing and supply management is 
generally termed green supply chain management (GSCM). GSCM can be 
explained as the plans and activities of a buying company that integrate 
environmental issues into SCM in order to improve the environmental 
performance of suppliers and customers (Bowen et al. 2001). It involves 
organizations assessing the environmental performance of their suppliers and 
requiring suppliers to undertake initiatives that eliminate or minimize 
negative environmental impacts (air, water and land pollution) and waste of 
resources (energy and materials), from the extraction of raw materials up to 
final use and disposal of products (Eltayeb et al. 2011; Handfield et al. 2005; 
Vachon & Klassen 2008). The motivation for companies to implement GSCM 
may be ethical and/or commercial, and it is a popular practice among 
companies trying to improve their environmental performance (Testa & Iraldo 
2010). The GSCM literature has focused on encouraging existing suppliers to 
improve their environmental performance by ‘requiring’ these suppliers to 
acquire certifications or to introduce green practices (Govindan et al. 2013).  
Seuring and Müller (2008) broadened the view of GSCM to also include the 
social dimension, leading to sustainable supply chain management (SSCM). 
They define SSCM rather widely as “the management of material, 
information and capital flows as well as cooperation among companies along 
the supply chain while taking goals from all three dimensions of sustainable 
development, i.e., economic, environmental and social, into account, which 
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are derived from customer and stakeholder requirements. In sustainable 
supply chains, environmental and social criteria need to be fulfilled by the 
members to remain within the supply chain, while it is expected that 
competitiveness would be maintained through meeting customer needs and 
related economic criteria” (p. 1700). Pagell and Wu (2009, p. 38) state that 
“to be truly sustainable a supply chain would at worst do no net harm to 
natural or social systems while still producing a profit over an extended 
period of time; a truly sustainable supply chain could, customers willing, 
continue to do business forever.” 
 
Sustainability is an important topic for most companies, and each organization 
is only as sustainable as its upstream supply chain (Handfield et al. 2005; 
Krause et al. 2009). Supplier involvement, supplier development and the 
establishment of environmental and social standards for supplier performance 
therefore become crucial to buying companies’ aim of sustainability (Sharma 
& Henriques 2005; Simpson et al. 2007; Tate et al. 2010). Given that the 
purchasing function has become a strategic function in most companies, the 
purchasing function and purchasing professionals play a very important role 
in making sure that sustainability initiatives are extended beyond the 
boundaries of the company (Paulraj et al. 2014). This has triggered the 
implementation of sustainable sourcing in the purchasing function (Schneider 
& Wallenburg 2012). Research shows that sustainable sourcing practice has 
the potential to become a dominant dynamic in the supply chain context (Cruz 
2008; Jayaraman et al. 2007; Pagell et al. 2010). Pagell et al. (2010, p. 58) 
define sustainable sourcing as “managing all aspects of the upstream 
component of the supply chain to maximize triple bottom line performance.” 
 
Focusing on sustainable sourcing, the social aspect often deals with 
establishing codes of conduct. Codes of conduct contain requirements for 
working conditions, human rights, health care, child labor, working hours and 
minimum wage (Egels-Zandén 2013; Jiang 2008; Mamic 2005). The 
environmental aspects of sourcing include purchasing’s responsibility to 
facilitate recycling, reduced packaging, reduction of hazardous materials, 
waste reduction, reuse of assets, cleaner production, and more strategic topics 
such as green product development and risk minimization (Hoejmose & 
Adrien-Kirby 2012; Klassen & Vachon 2003; Lee & Kim 2011; Schneider & 
Wallenburg 2012; Theyel 2001; Zsidisin & Siferd 2001). The past decade has 
shown that an increasing amount of research within the sourcing and supply 
chain management field is concentrating on sustainability related subjects. 
Key aspects of the literature are featured in the many literature reviews 
published within this decade (see Table 2). 
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Table 2: Sustainability related research subjects and reviews within the 
sourcing and supply chain management field. 
 
Sustainability related research 
subjects 
Literature reviews within 
sustainability related sourcing 
and supply chain management 
Green supply chain management, 
recycling, reuse, green purchasing, 
cooperation/collaboration/ 
coordination, social supply chain 
management, reverse logistic, green 
purchasing, Fairtrade,  
environmental management, social 
equity, close loop, performance 
measures, economic sustainability, 
ethics, life cycle analysis, CSR, social 
capital, remanufacturing,  
product stewardship, environmental 
standards,  
environmental sustainability, green 
supplier evaluation 
Carter & Jennings (2002), 
Srivastava (2007), 
 Carter and Rogers (2008), 
Seuring and Muller (2008), Gold 
et al. (2010) , Sarkis et al. (2011), 
Ashby et al. (2012)), Gimenez 
and Tachizawa (2012), Hassini 
et al. (2012), Hoejmose and 
Adrien-Kirby (2012),  
Miemczyk et al. (2012), Walker 
et al. (2012),  
Ahi & Searcy (2013), (Gupta et 
al. 2013), Martínez-Jurado & 
Moyano-Fuentes (2013), 
 Seuring (2013), Taticchi et al. 
(2013), Tachizawa & Wong 
(2014) Bush et al. (2015), 
Fahimnia et al. (2015)), 
Govindan, Soleimani, et al. 
(2015), Touboulic & Walker 
(2015), Govindan et al. (2016), 
Varsei (2016) 
 
 
2.1.1. SUSTAINABILITY GOVERNANCE 
 
Buying companies face a key challenge in managing sustainability aspects 
along the supply chain. To extend sustainability to suppliers, buying 
companies have developed different sustainability governance mechanisms 
and structures (Gimenez & Sierra 2012). 
As mentioned previously, each organization is only as sustainable as its 
upstream supply chain (Handfield et al. 2005; Krause et al. 2009), and the 
challenging aspect is that the boundary of responsibility often extends beyond 
the reach of a buying company’s ownership and direct control (Gimenez & 
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Sierra 2012). Social issues with suppliers, such as child labor, product safety, 
building fire and construction safety, minimum wage and overtime work 
(Egels-Zandén 2007), are beyond the reach of a buying company’s ownership 
and direct control, and the same applies to a buying company’s environmental 
performance, which can be negatively hit by a supplier’s poor environmental 
management (Faruk et al. 2002). Examples include the 2013 Rana Plaza 
collapse in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where more than 1,100 workers died, or 
Mattel’s 2007 recall of 20 million children’s toys due to led traces of lead 
found in them. In 1996, Nike took a lashing from the press, who accused Nike 
of profiting from ‘sweat-shops’ because some subcontractors were using child 
labor. Because of this challenge, buying companies have recognized the need 
to develop strategies that extend their traditional corporate governance 
processes beyond their own company boundary to their supply chain partners 
(Kytle & Ruggie 2005). These strategies and new ways of governing suppliers 
in a sustainability oriented direction are dealt with as sustainability 
governance structures in the sustainable sourcing literature. 
 
Raynolds (2004, p. 728) defines governance as “the relations through which 
key actors create, maintain, and potentially transform network activities.” A 
sustainability governance structure is what companies can use to coordinate 
other key actors in the supply chain. The main actor is typically a buying 
company in a developed country, who stipulates requirements and conditions 
in relation to supplier sustainability compliance (Bush et al. 2015). As 
mentioned above, the concept of governance is used in the sustainability 
sourcing literature to describe what buying companies are doing to reach 
beyond their borders to suppliers, and what strategies are being used to 
influence the suppliers and their sustainability related decisions. These 
strategies have gradually emerged in various sustainable governance 
structures, and are described by terms such as guidelines, supplier assessment 
activities and monitoring activities (Foerstl et al. 2010) (see Section 2.1.3). 
The governance concept, which was adopted from the transaction cost 
literature, is widely adopted in the sustainable sourcing literature, although 
with a different use. Concepts from different theories such as institutional 
theory, resource-based theory, stakeholder theory, relational view, and 
procedural justice (Adebanjo et al. 2013; Blome et al. 2014; Boyd et al. 2007; 
Brockhaus et al. 2013; Carter 2005; Vachon & Robert D Klassen 2008) are 
also mentioned and applied in the sustainable sourcing literature. Basically, 
these theories and areas of literature are applied to demonstrate what 
companies must do to have a sustainability-related impact on suppliers. 
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2.1.2. TWO DIRECTIONS OF SUSTANABILITY GOVERNANCE 
 
Sustainability governance and governance mechanisms are often divided into 
two main types: assessment-based and relationship-based. The assessment-
based type is characterized by a buyer-dominated approach that is adopted by 
buying companies to protect themselves against opportunism in terms of 
suppliers acting unethically or even illegally (Alvarez et al. 2010; Gimenez & 
Sierra 2012; Jiang 2009). Relationship-based governance, on the other hand, 
is characterized by cooperative norms, trust and commitment (Paulraj et al. 
2014). However, different authors sometimes use different terms for these 
governance structures. 
 
Gimenez & Sierra (2012) and Klassen & Vachon (2003), for example, make 
a distinction between two main governance structures, termed collaboration 
and assessment. The collaboration concept is mainly associated with the 
GSCM literature and follows the relational view (Vachon & Klassen 2008). 
Klassen and Vachon (2003) explain collaboration as the buying company’s 
direct involvement with suppliers in planning for environmental solutions. 
Environmental collaboration involves not only focusing on the products but 
also the production processes. The collaborative activities can, for example, 
result in product adaptations, fundamental process modifications, and 
cooperation in logistics (Klassen & Vachon, 2003). Control oriented activities 
such as monitoring and assessment are not included in environmental 
collaboration (Vachon & Klassen 2008; Sarkis 2003). The assessment 
governance structure, which is control based, is found in both the GSCM and 
the SSCM literature (Foerstl et al. 2010; Lee & Klassen 2008; Pagell & Wu 
2009). Assessment activities include monitoring activities in the form of 
supplier questionnaires, non-regulatory standards, and third-party audits that 
also typically include the environmental criteria. 
 
Jiang (2009) has yet another way of interpreting the two overall sustainable 
governance structures, calling them buyer-to-supplier governance and peer-
to-peer governance. In buyer-to-supplier governance, buying companies from 
advanced economies require suppliers to comply with controlled based 
governance mechanisms such as codes of conduct and the execution of audits 
to monitor the suppliers’ commitment. If suppliers are not compliant, the 
buying company may terminate the supply contract (Jiang 2009). In peer-to-
peer governance, on the other hand, buying companies help their suppliers 
and reward their efforts. This structure relies not on threats or mandatory 
requirements, but on relational governance mechanisms such as mutual 
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adaption in which idiosyncratic investments (e.g., ex ante training or 
workshops, or ex post incentives) must be made (Jiang 2009). 
 
Alvarez et al. (2010) distinguish between informal and formal sustainability 
governance structures. The formal structure can take the form of control and 
reporting systems such as codes of conduct (COC), requirements of standards, 
and monitoring activities. Informal systems, on the other hand, encompass 
additional governance coordination mechanisms characterized by 
relationships and norms rather than by bureaucratic structures (Alvarez et al. 
2010). A distinct shared understanding of two main sustainability governance 
structures is apparent in the literature—an assessment structure on one hand 
and a more relational structure on the other—either of which can be used by 
buying companies to govern supply side environmental and social practices. 
 
2.1.3. SUSTAINABILITY GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
 
The sustainable sourcing literature revolving around governance often focuses 
on specific sustainability related governance mechanisms used in the 
exchange between buying company and supplier. Governance mechanisms 
refer to the means adopted by the buying company to influence suppliers to 
act in a sustainable way. A governance mechanism is created by the buying 
company and implemented in the exchange with the supplier, in an attempt to 
actively influence supplier practices. 
 
Gimenez and Sierra (2012, p. 191) describe governance mechanisms as 
“those practices used by firms to manage relationships with their suppliers 
with the aim of improving their sustainability performance.” 
 
Depending on whether the focus is on environmental, social or economic 
sustainability, various sustainable governance mechanisms can be put to use.  
Both control-related and relational-based governance mechanisms include 
various requirements, and both are often implemented in buying companies 
(Reuter et al. 2010; Green et al. 1998; Large & Gimenez Thomsen 2011; Lee 
& Klassen 2008; Spence & Bourlakis 2009). A clear example of both would 
be a buying company that offers education and training in connection with 
demands for COC compliance. Within the sustainability sourcing and SCM 
area, the literature on sustainability governance mechanisms has been 
expanding over the past 10-15 years. Table 3 shows excerpts from the 
literature in this field. 
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Table 3: Literature within the sustainable sourcing and SCM area which 
encompass sustainability governance mechanisms. 
 
Author Year Journal Sustainability governance mechanisms 
Alvarez et al. 2010 SCMIJ 
formal/in-formal (assessment, development, collaboration, 
involvement) 
Andersen & Skjoett-
Larsen 2009 SCMIJ COC, audit, certificates., training, dialog 
Awaysheh & Klassen 2010 IJPOM certification, COC, monitoring, collaboration 
Azevedo et al.  2012 IEEE 
certificates, co-operation, Lean mechanisms, support, 
purchasing guidelines 
Baskaran et al.  2012 IJPE pressure 
Beske & Seuring 2014 SCMIJ Power/pressure, COC, collaborative 
Blome et al. 2014 IJOPM certificates, COC, development, collaboration., education 
Bourlakis et al.  2014 IMM certification, power, cooperation, investments 
Brockhaus & Knemeyer 2013 JBL corporation 
Caniato et al. 2012 IJPE monitoring, collaboration, development, certification 
Caniëls et al. 2013 JPSM corporation, design, COC, certifications 
Carter 2005 IJPDLM certifications, assessment, innovation, 
Carter & Rogers 2008 IJPDLM communication, involvement 
Carter &Jennings 2002 JBL innovation, labelling, product development, audits 
Chan et al.  2012 IMM certifications, design 
Cheng et al.  2008 SCMIJ audits, 
Czinkota et al.  2014 IMM assessment, collaboration, COC, monitoring 
Darkow et al.  2015 SCMIJ green design, collaboration, investment recovery 
de Brito et al.  2008 IJPE re-design, design, wood standards/collaboration 
Fernández & Kekäle  2005 JPSM assessment, certifications, audits 
Foerstl et al. 2010 JPSM Design, ISO,  
Giannakis & 
Papadopoulos  2016 IJPE 
involvement, design, specifications, industry standard, 
certification, assessment 
Gimenez & Tachizawa 2012 SCMIJ design, COC, audits, training, re-cycling, assessment 
Govindan et al. 2016 IJPR audit, evaluation 
Green et al.  2012 SCMIJ pressure 
Grosvold et al.  2014 SCMIJ assessment, collaboration 
Gualandris et al.  2014 SCMIJ 
specifications, innovation, collaboration, education, higher 
price, training, assessment, audit 
Handfield et al.  1997 JOM 
development, assessment, certifications, training, audit, 
support, education 
Handfield et al.  2002 EJOR 
COC, monitoring, training, audits, assessment, 
collaboration 
Hsu et al.  2013 IJOPM 
higher price, long term contracts, paying the costs of 
certifications, training, development 
Høgevold & Svensson  2012 JBIM 
measurement, reward, development, collaboration, 
certificate, higher price, traceability 
Jiang 2009 JOM 
COC, audit, monitoring, standards, cooperation, training, 
information sharing, mutual adaptions 
Kumar et al. 2012 IJPR 
COC, Certifications, monitoring, audits, coop with NGO´s, 
collaborating, teaching, development 
Kumar et al.  2013 Omega 
design, process optimization, pressure, certifications, audits, 
training, financial 
Kumar & Rahman  2016 JOCP development, training, involvement, design 
Lai & Wong  2012 Omega 
awareness seminars, guiding, sharing know-how, 
specifications 
Large & Gimenez 
Thomsen 2011 JPSM development, assessment, audit, monitoring, cooperation, 
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Lee  2010 HBR 
relation specific investments, certificate, contracts, 
monitoring, assessment, training 
Lee & Klassen 2008 POM monitoring, assessment, certification, relational 
Leigh & Li  2015 JOCP standards, contracts, certification 
Locke & Romis  2007 SMR audits, COC, accreditation schemes, training, collaboration 
Luthra et al.  2016 JOCP 
assessment, collaboration, certificates, audits, training, 
design, process development. 
Marshall et al.  2015 PPC 
COC, monitoring, collaboration, design, involvement, 
development, assessment 
Pagell et al. 2010 JSCM collaboration, certifications, monitoring, 
Pagell 2009 JSCM collaboration, monitoring, development, training, 
Peters et al.  2011 TIJLM 
product and process design, development, certificates, 
collaboration 
Rao  2002 IJPOM collaboration, certification,  
Rao  2004 IJPOM audit, certificates, COC, development, partnership/trust 
Rao & Holt  2005 IJPOM 
certificates, design, development, process, collaboration, 
monitoring, assessment 
Reuter et al. 2010 JSCM collaboration, design, audits, monitoring 
Saunders et al.  2015 JPSM collaboration, innovation, audit 
Schaltegger & Burritt  2014 SCMIJ design, cooperation, certification, pressure 
Simpson et al. 2007 IJOPM design, cooperation, certification, audit, pressure 
Simpson & Power  2005 SCMIJ pressure, certification, cooperation, audit, design 
Snider et al.  2013 JPSM assessment 
Spence & Bourlakis 2009 SCMIJ collaboration 
Tachizawa et al. 2012 IEEE COC, assessment, collaboration 
Tate et al.  2012 JPSM collaboration, cooperation 
Thoman et al.  2016 IJPDLM cooperation, training, audits, certificates, collaboration 
Touboulic et al.  2014 DS collaboration, involvement 
Vachon 2007 IJPR 
collaboration, training, certification, monitoring, COC, 
audit, involvement 
Vachon & Klassen 2006 IJOPM collaboration, involvement, COC, monitoring, certification, 
Vachon & Klassen  2007 IJPR collaboration, pressure, higher prices 
Vachon & Klassen 2008 IJPE 
certification, monitoring, collaboration, audits, product 
design, development 
Varsei et al. 2014 SCMIJ monitoring, training, education,  
Walker et al.  2008 JPSM 
COC, audits, monitoring, training, supplier development, 
collaboration, rewards, coercion 
Walton et al.  1998 IJPMM collaboration, information sharing, monitoring 
Wilhelm et al.  2015 JOM 
certification, collaboration, training, knowledge sharing, 
monitoring 
Wu et al.  2012 IJPE 
COC, audit, monitoring, collaboration, training, education, 
product and process development 
Wu  2013 SCMIJ collaboration 
Xie  2016 JOCP 
audits, education, training, supplier development, product 
development 
Zhu et al.   2012 IJPR collaboration, supplier development,  
Zhu et al.  2013 JPSM 
power, COC, audits, monitoring, certification, standards, 
collaboration, training, information /knowledge sharing 
Zhu & Sarkis  2004 JOM COC, audit, standards, monitoring,  
Zhu & Sarkis  2007 IJPR 
COC, audits, monitoring, certification, standards, 
collaboration, training,  
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Within the control-based structure, it is basically the same sustainable 
governance mechanisms that appear in the sustainability sourcing literature: 
codes of conduct, requirements of different standards, certifications, and 
monitoring procedures, including auditing. 
 
The use of codes of conduct by buying companies is widespread and perhaps 
the most frequent tool used to manage sustainability (World Bank 2003). A 
code of conduct is a formal written sustainability tool employed by companies 
to establish and communicate responsible business practices (Erwin 2010). 
Codes of conduct are applied to corporate policies and actions, and are often 
drawn from the United Nations’ Global Compact, which encourages 
corporations to embrace 10 principles incorporating the values of 
environmental sustainability, protection of human rights, fair treatment of 
workers, and elimination of bribery and corruption (Sethi & Schepers 2013). 
Codes of conduct are also inspired by other international conventions such as 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, or from 
different standards such as SA8000 (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen 2009). 
Although codes of conduct in companies often signal a sustainability 
commitment, this commitment is frequently not converted into action. The 
development and implementation of systems and procedures to manage codes 
of conduct are complicated, and no single template exists that can be applied 
by all companies (Mamic 2005). Many codes of conduct do not provide 
operational definitions of key stipulations, reducing their value (Preuss 2010). 
Often, the implementation is not checked in practice and a code of conduct 
can be paradoxical in nature, for example, with strategic decisions as low cost 
will dominate daily practice (de Brito et al. 2008). This is also linked to the 
observation that codes of conduct are applied to corporate policies and actions 
rather than to goods (Boyd et al. 2007). Locke et al. (2007, p. 21) argue that 
the code of conduct approach is “not producing the large and sustained 
improvements in workplace conditions that many had hoped it would.” 
 
The standards used by buying companies include the UN Global Compact, 
AA1000, SA8000, ISO14001 and GRI Guide Lines1, with only SA8000 and 
ISO14001 having a certificate. ISO 14001 is an environmental management 
standard system; however, the standard does not consider issues regarding 
purchasing and supply chain activities. In addition, ISO 14001 certification 
                                                
1 AA1000, AccountAbility Principles Standard (2008); SA8000, Social Accountability 
International; ISO14001, International Standard Organization – Environmental Management 
System; GRI Guide Lines, Global Reporting Initiative. 
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does not set out any specific standards for environmental performance, but 
rather certifies that the firm has an environmental management system in 
place with the purpose of improving the firm’s environmental performance 
(Hoejmose & Adrien-Kirby 2012). In addition, more industry-related 
sustainability certificates are used by buying companies relative to suppliers. 
In the textile and apparel industry, the use of standards, all with nearly the 
same requirements, is widespread. For example, the Business Social 
Compliance Initiative (BSCI) is required by European customers, the Supplier 
Ethical Data Exchange (SEDEX) is required by British customers and 
Worldwide Responsible Accredited Production (WRAP) is required by US 
customers. All three standards are built on nearly identical principles and are, 
together with AS8000, often used in place of company-specific codes of 
conduct, although some companies require compliance to both. Other 
product-specific certificates are also widespread in the textile and apparel 
industry. Examples of these are the GOTS certificate, which indicates that the 
textiles are made from organic fibers; the Oeko Tex, which ensures that the 
product has been tested for harmful substances; and the RDS, which ensures 
that all of the down and feathers used in textile production come from ducks 
and geese that have been treated humanely. It is often seen that these 
standards, which are required by buying companies, are designed to protect 
those buying companies against reputational risks associated with unethical 
supplier behavior, rather than to encourage positive sustainability behavior 
(Baden et al., 2009). Furthermore, according to Baden et al. (2009, p. 431), 
“the implementation of these standards generates costs, provides a low return 
on investment, does not necessarily lead to more business, and is easily 
evaded unless properly monitored.” 
 
The use of COCs and specific sustainable standards and certifications is often 
followed by audit procedures implemented to monitor supplier compliance 
and ensure that geographically distant suppliers are acting in ways that are 
consistent with the firm’s own standards (Awaysheh & Klassen 2010). These 
monitoring activities, which are clear sustainability-related governance 
mechanisms, are often conducted by the buying company itself or by third 
parties specialized in audits according to the different standards. Audits differ 
significantly from company to company, with durations ranging from a half a 
day to 4 days. Most of the audits are pre-announced but some are not. Most 
audits involve a factory inspection, talks with the managers, interviews with 
workers, and document checks (Gould 2005). Auditors face difficulties when 
seeking to collect accurate, objective and adequate information on working 
conditions and compliance with labor standards in the factories they inspect. 
This is because the audit process is often unsuitable for observing and 
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measuring the different labor standards, due both to lack of resources and to 
lack of auditor training and education (Locke et al. 2009). 
 
Monitoring activities can have far-reaching negative consequences for buying 
companies striving to achieve supplier compliance. Boyd et al. (2007, p. 342) 
state that “monitoring implicitly conveys a posture more akin to that of a 
supply chain ‘bully’ rather than a CSR ‘champion,’ seeking to gain 
compliance with its agenda through the use of coercive mechanisms, rather 
than working hard to achieve the shared goals of the different supply chain 
members.” Together with codes of conduct, certificates and standards, these 
control-based governance mechanisms may signal distrust between exchange 
parties and may prompt opportunism in uncertain situations (Das, T. K., Teng 
2002; John 1984), such as supplier factories feigning compliance during 
audits. In China and other developing countries, fraud surrounding audits has 
escalated (Jiang 2009). Suppliers are adept at double book keeping and in 
coaching their workers to answer correctly during worker interviews. This 
does not help the auditing process and it also reduces the possibility of 
sustainability-related improvements (Jiang 2008). These are examples 
showing that the sustainability-related relationship between a buying 
company and its suppliers is often not reciprocal, which can lead to a 
perception of the relationship as unfair and unbalanced (Luo & Zheng 2012). 
Opportunistic behavior can instead be regulated by the adoption of relational 
governance (Lusch & Brown 1996). Close relationships and social 
connections can deter partners from acting opportunistically because they 
want to preserve cooperative agreement or their reputation. Trust can also be 
developed by the parties as they cooperate and become more engaged over 
time (Servais & Jensen 2012), which would benefit the firms through reduced 
monitoring costs, faster decision-making, and enhanced organizational 
learning and adaptation (Alvarez et al. 2010; Uzzi 1997). 
 
Within the collaborative or relational sustainability governance structure, the 
most widespread sustainability-related governance mechanisms are mutual 
adaptations, idiosyncratic investments, supplier development, training, 
education, information exchange, and knowledge sharing (Gimenez & Sierra, 
2012; Jiang, 2009; Klassen & Vachon, 2003; Mamic 2005). An especially 
important relational governance mechanism is supplier development, which 
can be said to be superior to a number of other sustainable governance 
mechanisms because it often involves relational governance mechanisms such 
as education, training, innovation and information exchange. Training could 
include formal and informal training of key supplier personnel. For example, 
Apple aligns its supply chain through training programs created to aid 
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suppliers with compliance (Kumar et al. 2012). This relational mechanism 
may lead to a change in behavior, unlike control-based monitoring, which can 
lead to distrust and cooperation termination.  
 
2.2. GOVERNANCE 
 
Sustainability governance mechanisms were described and discussed in the 
section above. Governance structures and mechanisms clearly play important 
roles in buying companies’ efforts to achieve supplier sustainability 
compliance. This section therefore provides a more detailed description and 
explanation of the theoretical origins of the concept of governance. Before 
discussing the actual concept of governance, it is necessary to first explain 
some of the key concepts of transaction cost economics (TCE), because their 
existence is what makes governance a necessity. 
 
2.2.1. THE ORIGINS OF TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
 
In 1934, John R. Commons realized that there were several variations of 
systems/structures that could be used to exchange goods and services between 
separate units. The assessment of the various structures’ ability to harmonize 
relations between the parties, and the search for new structures were central 
to his research (Commons 1934). Ronald Coase (1937), on the other hand, 
faced a starker issue. He observed that the production of final goods and 
services involved a number of early stages and coordinating activities—e.g. 
collecting information and negotiating contracts—and that these were 
decision variables for an economic assessment that could determine whether 
a company will integrate or rely on the market. Coase (1937) suggested that 
the firm (hierarchy) is a governance structure that replaces the market because 
it can reduce transaction costs, and that the firm exists because it can mediate 
economic transactions between its members at a lower cost than a market 
mechanism can. Therefore, according to this view, which mode is adopted 
depends on the transaction costs attached to each transaction (Williamson 
1985). However, under certain conditions, markets are more efficient because 
they can mediate without the costs of managers, accountants, etc. (Ouchi 
1980). Coase’s (1937) work and insight on transaction costs became relevant 
almost 40 years later, thanks to Williamson's (1975) pioneering work. 
 
2.2.2. MARKET AND HIERARCHIES 
 
As stated, transaction cost theory predicts that transactions will be executed 
through the governance structure in order to minimize the transaction costs.  
To grow – and sometimes to survive – companies must make wise decisions 
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regarding the right governance structures for efficient supply chains (Guan & 
Rehme 2015). The term governance structure covers the various options that 
exist to organize a transaction. The two most basic structures are market and 
hierarchy (Williamson 1975). The former is a contractual regulatory structure 
between two legally distinct entities and is used when purchasing a product or 
service in the market with no relationship between parties. It is the contract 
law of (ideal) markets and is known as classical contracting (Williamson 
2002), which refers to the ideal transaction within law and economics, where 
the identity of parties is irrelevant: “Sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by 
clear performance” (Macneil 1974). If there are disagreements between the 
parties, the contract is governed by formal rules and laws. The second 
structure, hierarchy, represents another way to arrange a transaction. Here, the 
transaction takes place within the framework of an individual organization. 
Adaptations and decisions can be made sequentially when the need arises. 
Thus, no formal contract is required for transactions that are organized in the 
hierarchy (Lippert-Rasmussen & Mols 1994). In transaction cost theory, the 
market is the default solution, i.e. the governance structure chosen, unless 
there is a specific reason to choose otherwise (Williamson 1985). This is 
because the market is said to rule "high powered incentives," a concept that 
covers the assumption that independent units can quickly adapt to changes 
and act in accordance with their own interests better than units within an 
organization. Thus, a so-called downgrading incentive exists in the hierarchy, 
i.e. a situation where the relationship between effort and outcome is less 
direct. Such cases are called low-powered incentives (Williamson 1991). 
 
2.2.3. TRANSACTION COSTS 
 
TCE refers to the organization of economic activity within and between 
markets and hierarchies, where the transaction is regarded as the basic unit of 
analysis (Williamson 1975). Transaction costs are simply the costs of 
conducting an exchange, such as those costs incurred between firms  or in the 
transfer of resources between the levels of a vertically integrated firm (Luzzini 
et al. 2012). Arrow (1969) defines transaction costs as the “costs of running 
the economic system.” These costs are to be distinguished from production 
costs and appear as ex ante and ex post types. The ex-ante types are the costs 
of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement (Williamson 1985). 
The ex post costs can take several forms, including mal-adaption costs 
resulting from communication and coordination failures between parties to a 
contract (Dahlstrom & Nygaard 1999). Ex post costs also include haggling 
costs, which are the costs incurred if bilateral efforts are needed to correct ex 
post misalignments. Monitoring costs are also included in ex post costs 
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(Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999; Williamson, 1985). Because the costs are 
interdependent, they must be addressed simultaneously rather than 
sequentially (Williamson 1985). Both ex-ante and ex post costs are often 
difficult to quantify, but such difficulty can be mitigated by the fact that 
transaction costs are always assessed by comparing one mode of contracting 
with another (Williamson 1985). This means that it is the difference that 
matters rather than the absolute magnitude of the transaction costs. 
 
2.2.4. BEHAVIORAL AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES 
 
The key features of TCE (Williamson 1985) are distinguished by 1) the 
behavioral assumptions imputed to the contractual man, and 2) the attributes 
of transactions believed to be of economic importance (Williamson 1985). 
Behavioral assumptions are dealt with in different ways by economists, often 
as a matter of convenience, and the realism of the assumption is frequently 
considered less important (Williamson 1985). However, several researchers 
(Bridgeman 1955; Coase 1937; Jenkins 1980) have emphasized the 
importance of studying how the mind of man works, as he is acting. The two 
key behavioral assumptions on which transaction cost analysis relies are 
bounded rationality and opportunism (Williamson 1981). The first 
assumption, bounded rationality, is a semi-strong form of rationality; Simon 
(1961, p. xxiv) defines it as actors who are assumed to be “intendedly rational, 
but only limitedly so” (cited in Williamson  1985). The definition implies that 
it would be impossible for anybody to foresee and unambiguously describe 
every contingency that could possibly be relevant to the parties to an 
agreement or contract (Blois 1996). Such incomplete agreement can result in 
increased adaptation problems when firms are faced with new and changing 
conditions for which contingencies have not been specified and commitments 
have not been made (Gençtürk & Aulakh 2007). When confronted with the 
realities of bounded rationality, firms must consider the transaction costs of 
planning, adapting and monitoring and thereby consider which governance 
structures will be more efficacious, and for which types of transactions 
(Williamson 1985). The second behavioral assumption, opportunism, was 
introduced by Williamson (1979, p. 234), who defined it as “self-interest 
seeking with guile.” Williamson (1985, p. 47) describes guile as “lying, 
stealing, cheating, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.” Of the assumptions about human nature, 
opportunism occupies the most important spot in TCE theory (Tsang 2006); 
it is considered a key factor affecting the transaction costs of various modes 
of governance and the ultimate cause for the failure of markets and for the 
existence of hierarchies (Williamson 1993). Were it not for opportunism, all 
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behavior could be guided by rules, and comprehensive pre-planning would 
not be necessary. 
 
Besides the behavioral assumptions, the principal dimensions of transactions 
that are believed to be of economic importance are asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and frequency (Williamson 1985).  
 
When asset-specific investments are made, the transaction costs increase 
because of the governance precautions needed to protect against opportunism 
(Dyer 1996). 
Asset specificity is a non-redeployable investment made by one party in an 
exchange with one specific partner, and is the most important dimension when 
interpreting a transaction (Williamson 1985). A particular asset has a higher 
value in its primary intended application than it would have if one were to use 
the asset in a different context. Asset specificity emerges when sourcing 
relationships require significant relationship-specific investments into 
physical and/or human assets. Williamson (1985) mentions four different 
types of asset specificity: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human 
asset specificity, and dedicated assets. One example would be when a buying 
company invests in a supplier’s personnel training, production machinery or 
buildings (Jiang 2008; Poppo & Zenger 2002). This kind of investment cannot 
be redeployed in other exchanges should the relationship with the focal 
supplier be terminated; it therefore represents a sunk cost. 
 
The second dimension, uncertainty, represents information problems in an 
exchange (Williamson 1985). Koopmans (1957) distinguishes between 
primary and secondary uncertainty. Primary or external uncertainty is caused 
by market dynamism, which makes it more difficult to predict future 
contingencies (Williamson 1985; Child 1972). Secondary uncertainty or 
internal uncertainty is caused by task ambiguity, which makes it more difficult 
to specify outcomes and measure performance (Alchian & Demsetz 1975). 
Such performance measurement difficulties can result in clauses that include 
third party monitoring and the requirement of documents to justify work done 
(Poppo & Zenger 2002). 
 
The frequency of transactions is another relevant dimension. If asset 
specificity is low, frequency will not influence the governance structure, as 
the market should always be chosen in cases of low asset specificity. If, 
however, asset specificity reaches a certain level (and it is assumed that 
uncertainty exists), it will not pay to use the hierarchy structure in cases of 
low frequency. This is because investments associated with establishing a 
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specialized form of governance cannot be recovered if the transactions are 
infrequent. Only when the transaction frequency is sufficiently high will 
hierarchy be the optimal form of governance for transactions with relatively 
high asset specificity (Williamson 1985). Frequency has received very limited 
attention in the more recent literature on transaction cost theory and is clearly 
the least analyzed of the three economic principal dimensions (David & Han 
2004). 
 
2.2.5. HYBRID GOVERNANCE. 
 
As clarified previously, markets and hierarchies are polar modes of 
governance (Williamson 1975). However, Williamson (1985) is also 
convinced that transactions between the two polar modes are common. He 
states: “Suppose that transactions were to be arrayed in terms of the degree 
to which parties to the trade maintained autonomy” (1985, p. 83); market or 
discrete transactions are located at one extreme and hierarchical transactions 
are located at the other, with the hybrids forms in between the two. According 
to Williamson (1991), TCE has been criticized for only dealing with the polar 
forms of governance while neglecting such intermediates or hybrid forms. He 
argues that one of the main reasons that hybrids arise is that it is necessary to 
counter the increasing transaction costs caused by economic uncertainty and 
high asset specificity (Williamson 1985). 
 
The task of buying managers, according to TCE logic, is to craft governance 
arrangements that have minimal costs (Poppo & Zenger 2002). Such 
governance arrangements are crafted to match the exchange conditions and 
hazards. Unpredictable changes can affect the delivery of the desired quantity, 
the right price, and the quality of a supplier’s services. According to TCE 
logic, the greatest losses are incurred due to opportunism and uncertainty in 
exchanges that have specialized assets because transaction costs are increased 
(Poppo et al. 2008). Transactions with high asset specificity will therefore be 
pushed from market governance into more integrated forms of governance 
such as hybrids or hierarchies (Tsang 2006). Williamson (2002, p. 181) 
describes the hybrid as a “market-preserving credible contracting mode that 
possesses adaptive attributes located between classical markets and 
hierarchies.” Borys & Jemison (1989) define hybrids as “organizational 
arrangements that use resources and/or governance structures from more 
than one existing organization.” The latter definition is broad and may refer 
to organizations with a wide variety of different shapes, sizes and purposes. 
Shapes can refer to both formal and informal types of organizations. Examples 
of formal organizations include mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
license agreements. Informal organizations could include supplier 
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relationship arrangements and networks of relationships of power and trust 
(Jarillo 1988; Thorelli 1986). 
 
The hybrid governance structure is often chosen due to high asset specificity 
and moderate uncertainty. When chosen, the exchange converts from classical 
contracting where parties’ identities are irrelevant to neoclassical contracting 
where the identity of exchange partners is of high importance (Williamson 
1991). In formal hybrid inter-organizational exchanges, where trading parties 
remain autonomous but are mutually dependent to a significant degree, 
neoclassical contract law is used as the preferred governance mode (Aulakh, 
Preet S; Genctürk 2008). The written neoclassical contract is particularly 
important in such hybrid buyer-seller exchanges, as it lays a foundation by 
defining the rights and obligations of the parties (Aulakh & Genctürk 2008). 
A neoclassical contract is important for following reasons. First, it would be 
impossible for a party to anticipate all future contingencies. Second, a contract 
protects firms from a partner’s opportunism and thereby protects the asset 
investments. Third, the contract can be used in an exchange relationship to 
reduce risk and uncertainty. And fourth, the contract can be a mechanism for 
making a partner’s behavior predictable (Aulakh & Genctürk 2008; 
Williamson 1985). Such contracts facilitate continuity between the parties 
based on elastic mechanisms that promote efficient adjustment in the light of 
future unforeseen events (Williamson 1991) and neoclassical law generally 
reflects a more liberal philosophy with respect to maintaining relationships, 
even when there are disagreements (Gundlach & Achrol 1993). Neoclassical 
contracts can differ in clarity, strictness or concreteness depending on the type 
of exchange and type of hybrid. 
 
2.3. RELATIONAL EXCHANGE 
 
As it might be useful to distinguish between the different forms of exchanges, 
the framework of Macneil concerning the spectrum of discrete exchange and 
relational exchange has been used for this purpose (Noordewier et al. 1990). 
Macneil’s multidimensional typology of business exchange differentiates 
traditional, market based, arm's-length business exchanges—deemed 
discrete—from another form of exchange—the multidimensional, social, 
long-term, enduring relationship (Ferguson et al. 2005; Lambe et al. 2000). 
The discrete exchange can be explained as a one-shot transaction with no 
relationship formed between the parties; one example could be a purchase 
made at a gas station or from a vending machine. Relational exchange, on the 
other hand, involves a long-term, continuous and more complex relationship, 
with the relationship itself being more important than the individual 
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transaction (Kaufmann & Stern 1988; Macneil 1980). Macneil (1985) 
considers all exchanges relational because they are all embedded in the society 
(cited in Blois, 2002), but he also means that discrete exchanges are relatively 
free of relationships beyond those created by a common language, system of 
order, monetary system, or legal system enforcing promises (Macneil, 1985, 
p. 485, fn. 7). As such, Macneil is interested in all situations in which contracts 
exist between parties, and his view is that the term contract covers all 
occurrences of “the relations among parties to the process of projecting 
exchange into the future” (Macneil 1980, p. 4). 
 
In particular, Macneil (2000) has tried to understand the implications that may 
arise from what he calls the difference between 'living contracts' and 'contracts 
of law.' ‘Living contracts’ are contractual relations that exist outside the legal 
framework's ‘contracts of law.’ The main difference between the two is that 
the ‘living contract’ is dependent on many social relationships, while the 
‘contract of law’ is mainly dependent on ‘promises’ (Ivens & Blois 2004).  
 
2.3.1. RELATIONAL EXCHANGE NORMS 
 
Governance is defined in relational exchange theory (RET) as a set of 
contractual norms or shared expectations for how behavior must be regulated 
(Macneil 1980), and depending on the nature of these norms, there exists a 
continuum or spectrum that extends from discrete to relational exchange 
(Gundlach & Achrol, 1993). 
 
To understand the relational contract (Macneil 1985), one must contemplate 
an important dimension of the everyday aspect of exchange relations and 
transactions—contracting behavior (Macneil 1985). Macneil (1980) has 
developed a set of norms that stipulates that “the behavior that does occur in 
relations, must occur if relations are to continue, and hence ought to occur so 
long as their continuance is valued” (Macneil 1980, p. 64). Williamson 
(1985) categorizes exchanges by their governance form, whereas Macneil 
seeks to describe the behavior within an exchange. Furthermore, Macneil 
claims that the governance form used in an exchange does not determine the 
norms of behavior used in the exchange (Blois 2002). In the extant literature, 
a predominant interpretation of norms has emerged: “Norms are expectations 
about behavior that are at least partially shared by a group of decision 
makers” (Heide & John 1992, p. 34). Depending on where an exchange lies 
on the discrete-relational spectrum, the applicable norms change (Blois & 
Ivens 2006). Some of the norms are intensified at one end, and others at the 
other end. Kaufmann & Stern (1988) have proposed that norms differ in the 
sense that they manifest themselves differently in discrete transactions 
CHAPTER 2 THEORETHICAL FOUNDATION 
 
47 
 
compared to exchanges with a highly relational content. Discrete norms are 
expectations held by individuals or competitive interactions between 
exchange parties. According to Noordewier et al. (1990), they involve little or 
no expectation of continuity between exchange partners. Discrete norms are 
developed in exchange structures involving parties who are following 
independent strategies and goals. In contrast, relational norms derive from 
bilateral exchanges in which the parties are taking long-term strategies and 
goals into account; such norms are based on the mutuality of interest 
(Noordewier et al. 1990). Relational norms help manage exchange 
relationships not through legal contracts, but rather by behavioral expectations 
met with trust (Gundlach & Achrol 1993). Such norms play an ex ante role in 
the form of expectations, or as a way to prescribe appropriate behavior, and 
they have an ex post function as a guide for evaluating behavior. Norms 
complete the written contract if a conflict should arise (Ivens 2006). But which 
norms exist and how are they different from one another? 
 
2.3.2. SPECIFIC NORMS 
 
Macneil (1980, p. 38) developed nine norms or principles “of right action 
binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or 
regulate proper and acceptable behavior.” In 1983, he then developed a tenth 
norm and changed the name of one of the original nine. These ten norms are 
suggested by their creator to summarize various specific norms found in many 
different types of contractual relationships (Blois 2002). The ten norms are: 
 
(1) Role integrity. (2) Reciprocity. (3) Implementation of planning. (4) 
Effectuation of consent. (5) Contractual solidarity. (6) The linking norms: 
restitution; reliance; and expectation. (7) Creation and restraint of power. (8) 
Flexibility. (9) Proprietary of means. (10) Harmonization of the social matrix. 
 
Macneil (1980, p. 40) does not specify which norms are appropriate for a 
given business context and remarks: “This cake can undoubtedly be sliced in 
many ways.” Therefore, the list provided by Ivens (2006) will be used here to 
elaborate 11 different norms that he found to be relevant to business 
relationships after reviewing 34 papers on relational exchange theory to see 
which norms have been discussed. These 11 norms are: 
 
(1) Role integrity. (2) Planning. (3) Effectuation of consent. (4) Flexibility. (5) 
Solidarity. (6) Mutuality. (7) Conflict resolution. (8) Restraint in the use of 
power. (9) Information exchange. (10) Long-term orientation. (11) 
Monitoring. 
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The role integrity norm describes complex, long-term, proper and adequate 
behavior involving various obligations in more personal relationships (Ivens 
2006; Prim-allaz & Perrien 2000). The more relational commercial exchanges 
are, the more the role integrity shifts from seeking to maintain the one-
dimensional buyer-supplier role to maintaining more complex, multi-
dimensional roles. In relational exchanges, each party handles not only its own 
functions, but also acts as a facilitator for other internal tasks of the 
organization. An example would be that in a discreet exchange a buyer might 
only buy a product from a supplier, whereas in a relational exchange, the 
buyer might also help bilateral goal setting behavior for future joint action 
(Heide 1994; Palay 1984).  
 
The planning norm is distinct from the contracting process, since it is a more 
flexible and refined process, and when exchanges are more relational, the 
planning element is generally likely to be larger (Blois & Ivens 2006). 
Planning has come to dominate a great deal of the information in modern 
contracts and in forecasts that can help suppliers better plan production 
(Kaufmann 1987).The planning norm is proactive, with a focus on “how to do 
things” and “how to structure exchange relations” (Prim-allaz & Perrien 
2000), and the objective of the planning norm is to satisfy both parties’ future 
needs and agreements (Ivens 2005). 
 
Like planning, the effectuation of consent norm is a common contract norm 
dominant in more discrete transactions (Macneil 1985, fn. 187). Blois and 
Ivens (2006, p. 354), inspired by Hakansson & Snehota (1995), explain 
effectuation of consent in a lucid way: “Any exercise of choice involves the 
sacrifice of other opportunities. In a discrete exchange, by agreeing to sell my 
watch to another person it is clear that I give up the opportunity to sell it to 
somebody else. However, in a relational contract, I may in fact or by 
implication give the other party the ability to take actions that, while not fully 
determined in advance, will limit my future actions.” 
 
The flexibility norm is the actor’s readiness to adapt an existing implicit or 
explicit agreement to new environmental conditions (Noordewier et al. 1990). 
International buyer-supplier relationships often interact in less familiar 
political, cultural, and economic environments, making them subject to 
economic and political risk and uncertainty. Accordingly, it is essential for the 
parties to be flexible in such a relationship and to allow for modifications in 
good faith with respect to changing circumstances that may render existing 
practice ineffective (Gençtürk & Aulakh 2007). In a relational exchange, 
flexibility is the common bilateral expectation of a willingness to adjust as the 
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circumstances change, whereas in a discrete exchange, both parties perceive 
the terms of the exchange agreement to be binding (Heide & John 1992; 
Macneil 1981). 
 
The relational norm solidarity can be understood as the preservation of the 
relationship, especially in situations in which one party is in a predicament 
(Kaufmann & Stern 1988; Achrol 1997). Solidarity refers to the bilateral 
expectation that success comes from working together cooperatively and not 
competing against one another (Cannon et al. 2000; Heide & John 1992). This 
sense of common responsibility and interest dominates relational exchanges 
and to take advantage of solidarity parties must be willing to sacrifice some 
of their own interests, work together to find common solutions, and remain in 
the relationship under adversity, while also looking for opportunities that 
benefit one’s own organization (Gundlach & Achrol 1993). 
 
The mutuality norm is the notion that the realization of one’s own success is 
a function of everyone’s success. One cannot thrive at the expense of one's 
partner. This expresses a sense of shared responsibility (Cannon et al. 2000; 
Ott 2012). Highly relational exchanges are based on the mutuality of interest, 
unlike discrete exchanges, which involve little or no expectation of continuity 
(Kaufmann 1987; Noordewier et al. 1990). 
 
The conflict resolution norm consists of flexible, informal, and personal 
mechanisms for solving conflict in an exchange relationship (Kaufmann 
1987). The conflict resolution norm is the behavior shown by the parties when 
conflicts of interest arise (Ivens 2005). In discrete transactions, the conflict 
resolution process is usually stiff, formal, and external. If a dispute cannot be 
solved by ordinary economic forces, it will be settled in court according to the 
formal procedures set forth in contract law. In contrast, in a relational 
exchange, the parties will often try to resolve conflicts internally through 
being flexible, using personal conflict resolution procedures, or mediation 
(Kaufmann 1987). The more relational an exchange becomes, the more a 
separate and distinct social order is created within the relationship itself 
(Macneil 1980). 
 
The restraint in the use of power norm represents the expectation that none of 
the parties will apply their legitimate power against the other’s interest 
(Kaufmann & Dant 1992). This norm shows an understanding and 
forbearance regarding utilizing one's negotiating position in an exchange. 
According to the norm, the use of power will not only worsen a conflict over 
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time, but it will undermine mutual solidarity and make room for opportunism 
(Cannon et al. 2000). 
 
The information exchange norm is defined as the bilateral expectation that 
both parties in an exchange will provide to the other information that is useful 
to the relationship (Heide & John 1992). In all transactions between buyers 
and suppliers, some kind of information is exchanged. However, the quantity 
and type of information can vary. In a discrete exchange, buyers are not 
interested in nor do they need much information; only basic information like 
specifications, prices and information about delivery are required. In contrast, 
the information exchanged in a relational exchange is more extensive and 
often more long-term, such as forecasting information, planning, future 
product design information, and production planning schedules (Noordewier 
et al. 1990). 
 
The long-term orientation norm shows a party’s desire for and the utility of 
having a long-term relationship with another specific party in an exchange 
(Ganesan 1994). The time horizon in relational contracting is a central 
criterion in differentiating discrete from relational exchange (Ivens 2005). In 
discrete transactions, the fulfillment of obligations is done in accordance with 
classical contract law, and the last execution completes the transaction. In 
long-term relationships, a clear time frame is lacking (Noordewier et al. 
1990); the sharp in, sharp out mentality has been replaced by expectations of 
relational continuity (Macneil 1981). 
 
The last contracting norm described in the work of Ivens (2006) is monitoring, 
which can refer to ex ante and ex post control or supervisory actions in 
business relationships (Noordewier et al. 1990). Monitoring concerns the 
actions taken by the buyer to ensure supplier performance in an exchange 
agreement. In a discrete exchange, the measurement process is reactive and 
takes place upon task completion. In a relational exchange, the monitoring 
activities are more proactive, and active supervision is used by the buyer to 
ensure the specified performance. Measurements are dealt with by 
socialization processes that promote (internal) self-control (Heide 1994; 
Noordewier et al. 1990). 
 
The differences between the 11 norms mentioned are obvious and they differ 
depending on where on the discrete-relational spectrum they are positioned 
(Kaufman and Stern 1988). Norms are shared expectations but they are “not 
necessarily externally enforceable” (Kaufmann 1987, p. 75), and they cannot 
even adjust the interests of the parties so that agreements are enforced 
perfectly, but they define both appropriate and deviant behavior (Ivens 2006). 
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Ivens (2006) distinguish between those norms, which control value creation 
and those, which create value in an exchange (Table 4), an interesting 
foundation for this project in terms of achieving value in the form of supplier 
sustainability compliance. 
 
2.3.3. NORMS CREATING AND CONTROLLING VALUE 
 
Some norms expand the level of value created. Other norms control value-
claiming behavior, governing the distribution of value among the parties 
(Ivens 2006; Kaufman 1987). Kaufman (1987) examines how norms impact 
the negotiation process and how five of the most common contracting norms 
(Table 4) encourage value-creating behavior and discourage strategic value-
claiming behavior (Kaufman 1987). 
 
Table 4: Norms creating and controlling value, adapted from Ivens (2006) 
and  Kaufman (1987). 
 
Dimension Norm Description 
 
Norms that  
control 
value  
creation 
 
 
Solidarity 
Preservation of the relationship, 
particularly in situations in which one 
partner is in predicament (Kaufmann and 
Stern, 1988; Achrol, 1997) 
 
Role integrity 
Maintenance of complex 
multidimensional roles forming a network 
of relationships (Kaufmann, 1987, p. 76) 
 
Flexibility 
The actor’s readiness to adapt an existing 
implicit or explicit agreement to new 
environmental conditions (Noordewier et 
al., 1990) 
 
Norms that  
create value 
 
Restraint in the 
use of power 
Expectation that no actor will apply his 
legitimate power against the partner’s 
interest (Kaufmann and Dant, 1992) 
 
Harmonization 
of conflict 
 
Application of flexible, informal and 
personal mechanisms to the resolution of 
conflicts (Kaufmann, 1987) 
 
The relational solidarity norm is a value-creating norm that encourages the 
parties to look beyond their own interests toward more integrated solutions. 
The parties' expectations of continued commercial interaction can encourage 
relationship-specific investments, which may lead to an increase in the 
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common value for both parties (Kaufman 1987). Role integrity is another 
relational value-creating norm, and the more relational exchanges are, the 
more complex the roles in the exchange become. The matters that parties 
negotiate and communicate are expanding and the potential for value-adding 
relations is increasing. This makes it possible for each party to respond to a 
broader set of counterparty interests (Kaufman 1987). The final value-creating 
relational norm that Kaufman (1987) examines is flexibility. When there is 
flexibility in a relationship, the parties are not stuck in e.g. a suboptimal 
position with a high cost of re-negotiation; instead, the constant exploration 
of better conditions and opportunities is encouraged (Kaufman 1987). Of the 
two norms that control value-claiming behavior, the first is restraint in the use 
of power (Kaufman 1987). In discrete transactions, power reflects the 
alternatives that are available to each party and it is expected that the parties 
will use this power, e.g. by threats of exit, in order to achieve the expected 
distribution of the value created in the exchange (Kaufman 1987). In relational 
exchanges, a different kind of power is used. Most often, according to the ties 
that have formed between the parties, it is agreed that one party will have the 
power to act in the interest of both parties. For example, when a buyer uses 
his power to set up supplier sustainability-related requirements to create 
value, these requirements must be in the interest of both parties. 
 
The second value-claiming behavior norm is conflict resolution. Value-
claiming behavior often involves threats and often results in episodes of 
conflict. Here, the rigid discrete norm of formal conflict resolution does 
nothing to resolve the underlying conflict. In relational exchanges, the more 
open and flexible form of conflict resolution includes procedures that 
discourage value-claiming behavior through processes that mitigate distortion 
of information (Kaufman 1987). 
 
Win-lose negotiation is characteristic of an exchange with discrete norms. The 
rigid approach employed by the parties as well as the short-term and non-
repeated nature of the negotiations deters value creation, and emphasizes the 
distributive element in the exchange. Exchanges that are characterized by 
relational contract norms, as described above, are more likely to give rise to 
value-maximizing solutions, while also leading to a fair distribution of the 
exchange profits. Some of the five value-creating/controlling norms 
elaborated above directly affect the parties' ability to extend the value created 
in the exchange, while others control the process of distributing this value. A 
relational exchange does not automatically make a negotiation or transaction 
a win-win process. For the deal to be successful, the value created must be 
divided among the parties according to mutual interests. The relational norms 
simply work to increase the parties' ability to find better solutions in their 
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negotiations, and at the same time discourage opportunistic value-claiming 
behavior (Kaufman 1987). As mentioned, the distributional aspect is an 
important element of an exchange and in the realization of value in a 
relationship. Therefore, the concept of distributive justice in a buyer-supplier 
exchange will be elaborated in the next section. 
 
2.3.4. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN BUYER-SUPPLIER 
EXCHANGES 
 
Norms are expected patterns of behavior in a relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987), 
and many factors can affect this behavior, such as the time criterion of a 
relationship, the complexity of the relationship, or the extent of risk, 
uncertainty, and conflict. Another significant factor influencing behavior is 
expectations (Frazier et al. 1988), which can include both economic factors 
and social values (Blau 1964; Granovetter 1985). In a commercial 
relationship, achieving some type of desired end-patent, reducing time to 
market, or gaining control over future technologies or potential commercial 
applications, among others, can be desired expectations (Jap 2001). Another 
expectation in day-to-day interactions is fairness (Gross 2007). The 
perception of fairness is associated with the means by which outcomes arise 
from the interaction between exchange partners, understood as procedural 
justice, or the fairness of the outcomes of the exchange between, for example, 
buyer and supplier, defined as distributive justice (Boyd et al. 2007). 
Procedural justice, as introduced by Thibaut & Walker (1975), suggests that 
people are often concerned about fairness in processes, and will view 
procedures as fair if they perceive themselves to have control over the process. 
Distributive justice demonstrates a fairness in, for example, the sustainability 
exchange relationship between buyers and suppliers, and thus has an influence 
on supplier sustainability compliance. Distributive justice originates from 
social exchange theory (SET), which plays a prominent role in explaining 
exchange (Hawkins et al. 2008). 
 
As stated by Frazier (1987), the success of a relationship is contingent upon 
how the exchange’s outcome is divided among the parties according to mutual 
interest. Success can therefore be defined by distributive justice, explained by 
Homans (1961, p. 13) as follows: “A man in an exchange relation with 
another will expect that the rewards of each man be proportional to his costs 
– the greater the rewards, the greater the costs – and that the net rewards, or 
profits, of each man be proportional to his investments – the greater the 
investments, the greater the profit.” Social exchange theorists like Homans 
(1958), Blau (1964) and Adams (1965) have been instrumental in developing 
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the theoretical foundation used to explore social factors like fairness, equity, 
and justice in buyer-supplier relational exchanges(Wagner et al. 2011). 
Distributive justice is related to equity theory (Adams 1965), which originally 
focused on employees' perception of the fairness of outcomes such as wages 
and promotions. Social exchange theory (SET) argues that individuals and 
corporate groups interact with one another for rewards or the expectation of 
rewards (minus the penalty/cost) (Emerson 1976; Griffith et al. 2006; Homans 
1958). For a dyad consisting of A and B, Adams (1965) represents the 
distributive justice between them schematically, as seen in Figure 5. 
 
 
𝐴´𝑠	𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠	𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠	𝐴´𝑠	𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝐴´𝑠	𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
=
𝐵´𝑠	𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠	𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠	𝐵´𝑠	𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝐵´𝑠	𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
 
 
Figure 5: Equation showing distributive justice between A and B by Adams 
(1965), also displayed in Paper 3. 
 
Social theorists (Homans 1958; Blau 1964) offer a theoretical foundation for 
social factors in buyer-supplier relational exchange research. Relational 
theory borrows from SET to support the current supply chain management 
research agenda (Wagner et al. 2011). 
 
In asymmetrical buyer-supplier relationships, distributive justice is a matter 
of whether the weak party considers the division of benefits and burdens 
received by the more powerful party as reasonable (Duffy et al. 2013). Unlike 
traditional economic theory, which focuses exclusively on financial 
performance and outcome, SET acknowledge that companies in relational 
exchanges will assess the outcome of cooperation relative to preconceived 
expectations of rewards (Wagner 2011), which, as mentioned, include both 
economic factors and social values (Blau 1964; Granovetter 1985). When the 
result is deemed to be fair and the distribution of rewards and incentives over 
time is acceptable, the exchange parties will consider the relationship 
beneficial and achieve good task performance (Griffith et al. 2006; Poppo & 
Zhou 2014). Conversely, parties who see an imbalance in terms of their 
perceived contribution/benefits will feel dissatisfaction. For example, 
suppliers who feel they have been treated unfairly in relation to the actual 
outcomes or input/output ratio may try to correct the imbalance by reducing 
their output, changing the outcomes, or aggressively avoiding action in the 
future and completely withdrawing from the relationship (Duffy et el. 2013; 
Homans 1961). Homans (1961, p. 75) states: “The more to a man’s 
disadvantage the rule of distributive justice fails of realization, the more likely 
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he is to display the emotional behavior we call anger.” In a buyer-supplier 
relationship, such a perception of unfair distribution of outcomes can 
negatively affect ongoing work, and the ensuing conflict can damage no only 
the relationship but also the delivery of agreed-upon products (Poppo & Zhou 
2014). 
 
These aspects of relational governance, as found in the literature on RET and 
SET, show that relational governance positively affects exchange 
performance (Dyer 1996; Heide & John 1990; Zaheer et al. 1998). This effect 
is also found in the sustainability governance literature, where the two 
sustainability governance structures (control and relationship) produce 
different types of performance results. As mentioned, control-based 
sustainability governance mechanisms could lead to lack of trust in the 
relationship and to opportunistic behavior, especially among suppliers. In 
contrast, a relationship-based governance structure with development-related 
sustainability governance mechanisms could guide and help suppliers 
improve their ability to comply with sustainability measures. Exchange 
hazards such as uncertainty and risk of opportunism require companies to 
invest in the development of trusting relationships, because these can make 
the exchange parties adopt a joint and long-term orientation, and can make 
them show a willingness to trust and be vulnerable to one another (Zhou & 
Poppo 2010). 
 
2.3.5. BUYER-SELLER RELATIONSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT 
MODELS 
 
The concepts of governance and relational exchange have been reviewed 
above, including both governance in the context of sustainability and 
governance in a more traditional sense. As described, the general concept of 
governance deals with how companies can defend or protect themselves 
against various hazards and costs, either through control, or through a more 
relational means. Furthermore, the elaboration of the concepts of norms and 
distributive justice has revealed the factors influencing a relational exchange. 
These theoretical concepts show that in a sustainability-oriented exchange, it 
might be necessary to look at which governance structure would be best. It 
also might be necessary to develop relationships in order to achieve supplier 
sustainability compliance. Fig. 6 is a representation of the different factors or 
concepts at play. 
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Figure 6: Illustration of the representation of the different factors or 
concepts in play. 
 
The focus of this section is therefore how buying companies can develop and 
maintain the relationships with their suppliers and thus contribute to value 
creation related to sustainability compliance. A summary of some of the 
fundamental and most important models concerning relationships and 
development found in the literature is provided. 
 
The first model that will be elaborated is the interaction model (Haakansson 
1982). This model identifies and explains the nature and processes of buyer-
seller interaction and provides a well-established and rigorous 
conceptualization of relational exchange within a business-to-business 
context. The interaction model also provides a useful structure and framework 
for use in analyzing and developing a business-to-business relationship (Woo 
& Ennew 2004). The second framework is the relationship development 
process of Dwyer et al. (1987), who propose a classification scheme based on 
the five stages through which business relationships develop. Third, the work 
of Ring and Van de Ven (1992, 1994) will be discussed. Hybrid forms of 
collaboration and relationships differ from markets and hierarchies, and Ring, 
and Van de Ven (1992) provide the criteria they believe underlie the choice 
of governance in cases of repeated cooperation between organizations—
namely, risks and dependence on trust. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) 
furthermore explain the developmental process of cooperative inter-
organizational relationships. Fourth and finally, the research of Frazier et al. 
(1988) will be presented, as it contributes interesting insights into how 
important concepts such as ‘just in time’ (JIT) can be implemented with 
suppliers. The authors ask which conditions are most conducive to and which 
key factors influence the success or failure of the implementation of a 
collaborative concept. Together, these development models and the results 
concerning the implementation of a collaborative concept are particularly 
interesting in relation to buying companies’ implementation of sustainability 
requirements in their relationships with suppliers. 
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The interaction model 
 
In the 1990s, the focus on buyer-seller relationships in business markets 
increased (Cannon & Perreault Jr. 1999), and an immense quantity of 
empirical work was performed. Relationship theories were re-thought and 
new theories evolved. The reason for this was that the purchasing function 
became strategically important in companies, who discovered the importance 
of managing their external resources in order to increase competitiveness. 
Instead of only looking at discrete buying and new buy decisions, the research 
began to consider more routine and common response behavior to find out 
how new relationship strategies were made over a long period of time 
(Campbell 1990). Companies cut costs, and conventional ‘arm’s length’ 
arrangements were superseded by closer relationships with suppliers (Carr & 
Pearson 1999; Heide & John 1990). Both new ways of facing cost strains and 
also fast changes in technology and general economic conditions led to the 
call for new ways to address old problems (Cannon & Perrault 1999), 
implying a shift away from the market-based governance structure to a more 
bilateral governance form (Williamson 1985). Many ideas were put forward 
in the literature about which factors and concepts are involved in buyer-
supplier relationships and how such relationships are developed. 
 
An early model of the buyer-seller relationship was made by the International 
Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group. The IMP Group was founded in the 
mid-1970s by several European researchers. The group developed a dynamic 
model of buyer-supplier relationships in business markets called the 
interaction model (Figure 7), and illustrated its applicability through 
comparative studies of buyer-supplier relationships within and across a 
number of European countries. The original IMP project was aimed at 
understanding the nature of buyer-seller relationship and how suppliers and 
buyers have handled their relationships. Around 300 companies covering 15 
different industries in 5 countries were involved in the study. Wilson and 
Mummalaneni (1986) argue that the interaction model is the best model for 
dealing with the unit of analysis in the model rather than the single company 
or individual purchase. The IMP group adopted the notion that the critical task 
of a buying company is to deal with various issues related to the buyer-
supplier relationship. This relationship revolves around the development and 
management of supplier relationships (Ford 2002). The interaction approach 
developed by the IMP group is based on the inter-organizational theory and 
marketing literature (Ford 2002). In inter-organizational theory, the focus is 
on the relationships between organizations rather than within an individual 
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organization. Furthermore, the interaction approach is built on a number of 
factors that the IMP group find important for industrial markets (Ford 2002). 
For instance, both the buyer and the supplier are regarded active players in the 
exchange (Ford 1980), and they may have a close and long-term relationship, 
which makes maintaining the relationship an important task for both parties. 
Four groups of variables are identified in the interaction approach: 1) variables 
describing the elements and process of interaction; 2) variables describing the 
parties involved, both organizations and individuals; 3) variables describing 
the environment within which the interaction takes place; and 4) variables 
describing the atmosphere affecting and affected by the interactions. These 
variables describe and influence the interaction between buyer and supplier 
(Ford 2002, p. 23). 
 
 
Figure 7: The Interaction Model (Håkonsson 1982) 
 
As mentioned, the relationships between buyer and supplier are often long 
term and the interaction model distinguishes episodes involving the two 
parties as individual episodes in the interaction process. Although such short-
term episodes may represent the building blocks of relationships, the longer-
term aspects can also affect each episode (Ford 2002; Woo & Ennew 2004). 
One of the core elements of the interaction model is the four individual types 
of exchanges (Kern & Willcocks 2002). The first, product or service 
exchange, forms the core. The second type is information exchange, which is 
essential and can differ in content, e.g. financial, technical, media 
communication, and in the degree of formality. Because of their complexity, 
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such interactions and exchanges often entail risk and uncertainty, and the 
information exchange can be either personal or impersonal. The third type is 
financial exchange and the quantity in question reveals the importance of the 
relationship. Finally, the fourth type of exchange, social exchange, can help 
reduce uncertainty and is an important function, especially in cases of limited 
experience or cultural or spatial differences. Factors such as formalization, 
trust, integrity, and flexibility are important in social exchange (Cunningham 
1980; Ford 2002). Individual and social exchange episodes have an impact in 
building long-term relationships. Expectations and routines become 
institutionalized and adaptations are made either to the elements exchanged 
or to the processes of the exchange. Within the IMP framework, the two long-
term relationship behaviors of institutionalization and adaptation are essential 
to the maintenance of long-term relationships (Ford 2002). 
 
The parties in the interaction process and their characteristics are important—
both the characteristics of the organizations, but also of the representative 
individuals (Ford, 2001). The technology characteristic is central, as product 
features and manufacturing processes can be important for both the buyer and 
the supplier in the interaction process, and technologies can be understood as 
tying buyer and supplier together. Depending of the level of customers’ and 
suppliers’ technological skill and experience, different kinds of relationships 
can exist (Cunningham 1980). Organization size, structure, and experience 
also influence the interaction process, giving the participants a basic position 
from which to interact and share resources (Ford 2002). Regarding the 
characteristics of individuals, usually at least two individuals are involved in 
a relationship—in our case, a buyer and a supplier. More common, however, 
is the situation in which several individuals with different roles and at 
different levels in their organization are involved in intercompany personal 
interactions (Cunningham 1980). In such an interaction, relationships are 
developed and information is exchanged, thus building up social bonds that 
influence the relationship (Ford 2002). 
 
The third variable, interaction environment, is important because the 
interaction between buyer and supplier cannot be analyzed in isolation, but 
must be done so within a wider context that accounts for important factors 
such as market structure, dynamism, internationalization and the social 
system. The market structure refers to how many buyers and suppliers are 
acting on the market. This could be of importance and affect the relationship, 
for instance in terms of pressure on the market. Also, the degree of dynamism 
or change in the market can affect the relationship in two ways: it affects the 
ability to make forecasts and predict the behavior of the other party, and it 
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also affects the costs of being dependent on one or a few relationships. 
Dynamics therefore determine the extent to which companies can afford to 
develop close relationships (Cunningham 1980). The level of 
internationalization of the buying or supplying market is also of interest, as it 
can influence the motivation to develop international relationships. This factor 
may contribute to the need for purchasing offices located around the world or 
foreign subsidiaries, as well as new and specialized knowledge about 
languages, cultures, and international trade (Ford 2002). The buyer-seller 
relationship is surrounded by a social system, which is particularly important 
in an international context. Preferences for and experiences of selling to and 
buying from companies in foreign countries, and the fact that special 
languages and ‘rules’ exist within particular industries represent important 
information (Cunningham 1980; Ford 2002). 
 
The final element in the interaction model is the atmosphere, which the IMP 
Group (Ford 2002) describes in terms of power/dependence, the degree of 
conflict or cooperation, and the overall social distance between the parties. 
The atmosphere is created by the individual exchange episodes and the longer-
term experience with the partner. The atmosphere is a product of the 
relationship and affects the different groups of variables that are present (Ford 
2002; Kern & Willcocks 2002). The interaction model prescribes a way to 
help structure the “world” and thereby the problems within it (Ford 2002, pp. 
30). For this thesis, the model contributes an understanding of the variables to 
consider when analyzing a relationship. The interaction approach provides an 
understanding of the elements of a relationship. 
 
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 
 
As stated by the IMP Group, one of the critical tasks of a buying company is 
the development of the supplier relationship (Ford 2002). An ambitious effort 
to meet the theoretical challenge of relationship development was made by 
Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh (1987), who proposed a classification scheme based 
on the stages and processes through which business relationships develop. 
The model was developed due in part to a lack of research on buyer-supplier 
relationships and also because a great part of the literature only dealt with 
discrete exchanges. As opposed to discrete exchanges, relational exchanges 
transpire over time, and each transaction must be viewed in terms of its history 
and its anticipated future (Dwyer et al. 1987, pp. 12). Dwyer et al. (1987) 
describe the relationship life cycle in five stages, each representing a major 
change in how the buyer and supplier regard one another. The five stages are 
1) awareness, 2) exploration, 3) expansion, 4) commitment, and 5) 
dissolution. 
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The first stage, awareness, concerns whether one party finds the other to be a 
feasible partner. Here, the parties become aware of one another. Although no 
interaction between the parties has yet taken place, the parties may engage in 
unilateral positioning and talk to make themselves attractive. Once there is 
any kind of bilateral interaction, the next phase of relationship development 
begins (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
 
In Stage 2, exploration, the potential exchange partners seek relevant 
information and weigh the pros and cons of possible cooperation. The period 
might be short, but can be extended with product tests and evaluations. Such 
evaluations may result in trial orders, but such a loose connection or 
relationship can be very fragile. Due to minimal investments and 
interdependence, termination of the relationship is easy. Dwyer et al. (1987) 
conceptualize the exploration phase as consisting of five sub-processes: 1) 
attraction, 2) communication and bargaining, 3) development and exercise of 
power, 4) norm development, and 5) expectation development. The first sub-
process and initial step of the exploration stage is attraction, which concerns 
rewards delivered directly to the buyer by the supplier, as well as rewards and 
incentives linked to the particular characteristics by suppliers (Klepper 1995). 
Direct rewards are the benefits the supplier receives from work done by the 
buyer, both in the past and currently during the exploration phase. The better 
buyers and suppliers are able to meet the other's requirements and the better 
the cooperation is progressing, the higher the rewards and incentives will be. 
The second sub-process in the exploration phase is communication and 
bargaining. The information here is more than day-to-day information 
exchanged between buyer and supplier. Communication also implies that each 
party is open with regards to needs and resources related to the future 
relationship. If the relationship is to survive, it is important that confidential 
information be contributed by both sides. Later, when the relation is 
established, there may be less need for reciprocity (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
Suppliers who are willing to discuss their future expectations as well as their 
abilities, strengths and weaknesses, and who expect to receive similar 
information from the buyer, have better opportunities for establishing a 
partnership. Negotiations arise in connection with contracts and agreements 
and regarding changes or corrections to agreements; this negotiation is critical 
in resolving conflicts. The more easily conflicts between buyer and supplier 
are resolved, the higher the chance of increased cooperation and the 
development of a good relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987; Klepper 1995). The 
third sub-process is power and justice. A party has power over another party 
if that other party is dependent on the former's valuable resources. This power 
FROM GOVERNANCE TO SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT 
62 
 
is enhanced if the other party’s access to alternative resources is limited 
(Klepper 1995). Power can be just or unjust. It is unjust when one party uses 
its power only for personal gain and there is a lack of understanding on the 
part of the other party. Just power is when both parties benefit from the power 
or when the other party is compensated for the first party’s use of power 
(Dwyer et al. 1997). The fourth sub-process is norm development. The norms 
and standards that characterize a relationship appear in the exploration phase 
of relationship development. Norms deal with expected patterns of behavior 
within a relationship, and these norms guide the buyer and supplier actions 
and set the agenda for future interaction (Dwyer et al. 1987). The last sub-
process in the exploration phase is expectation development. In a relationship, 
each party has an expectation about the other's behavior. Trust is an important 
concept in understanding these expectations. A party may take actions that are 
beneficial for the other party with the expectation that the other party will 
reciprocate. These expectations and the actions carried out are constructed by 
confidence. When expectations are met, trust builds, allowing expectations to 
rise, which in turn creates more confidence if these expectations are met 
(Dwyer et al. 1987). This upward spiral of met expectations and trust is a 
critical element in the development of a relationship between buyer and 
supplier, and is a necessary basis for both parties in terms of investment in 
assets and capabilities that are relationship-specific (Dwyer et al. 1987). To 
summarize, these above five sub-processes are important aspects of the 
exploration phase, as they make it possible for the parties to assess how well 
they fit together. 
 
The third phase in this development model is the expansion phase. The five 
sub-processes describe above continue to exist in this phase. The main 
difference is that what has built the foundation for trust and mutual 
satisfaction in the exploration phase is now leading to increased risk in the 
exchange, thus increasing the interdependence. Expansion refers to the 
sustained increase of benefits achieved by the parties and their increasing 
interdependence (Dwyer et al. 1987). The outcome of the exploratory phase 
has demonstrated the counterparty's ability and willingness to deliver the 
desired outcome, and the motivation to maintain the relationship increases 
when a party meets its expected obligations in a satisfactory manner. This is 
also because the better the results of the exchange, the less likely the other 
party will be to use alternatives. Buyer uncertainty also begins to decrease in 
the expansion phase because the relationship has evolved from being 
characterized by probing and tests to being more characterized by reciprocity 
and increased rewards and incentives provided to one another (Claycomb & 
Frankwick 2010). Good results and cooperativeness lead to interaction 
beyond what was strictly necessary in the beginning (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
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The fourth phase in the model is commitment. According to Dwyer et al. 
(1987), this phase is the most advanced stage of buyer-supplier 
interdependence. The parties have reached a level of satisfaction through the 
exchange process and the satisfaction virtually excludes the use of other 
primary collaborators who could provide the same benefits. Here, 
commitment refers to an implicit or explicit promise of a continued 
relationship. Dwyer et al. (1987) sets forth three measurable criteria for 
commitment: inputs, durability, and consistency. Inputs concern what is 
contributed by the parties to the relationship, e.g. finances, communication 
and/or emotional resources. The second criterion is durability. Here, the 
parties' willingness to make environmental adjustments can have an impact 
on the relationship’s substantive stability. Durability requires parties to 
distinguish between the benefits that are associated with the relationship and 
to act in relation to the environment in a way that would encourage continued 
effective exchange (Dwyer et al. 1987). The third aspect of commitment is the 
consistency with which the inputs are made to the relationship. If the input 
from a party varies relative to expectations, the other party will find it difficult 
to predict the results of the exchange. Such variability may reflect low 
engagement and lead to less reliance by the other party. A clear feature of the 
commitment phase is that the parties are targeting resources to maintain the 
relationship (Dwyer et al. 1987). 
 
The final stage is dissolution. The possibility of withdrawing or suspending 
cooperation has been present throughout the development process and not all 
dyadic linkages are deliberately developed using the aforementioned four 
phases (Dwyer et al. 1987). The model provides an overview of the stages that 
are relevant and important in the development of a relationship, and 
understanding the life cycle of a buyer-supplier relationship is potentially 
useful in theory development (McKelvey & Aldrich 1983). 
 
Ring and Van de Ven 
 
Another ambitious effort to meet the theoretical challenge regarding 
relationships and their development has been made by Ring and Van de Ven 
(1992, 1994). The authors provide a conceptual framework for the alternative 
cooperative governance mode, which considers risk and trust as criteria in the 
choice of governance structure. They explore the two types of contracting—
recurrent and relational. Recurrent contracts consist of repeated exchanges 
that have only a moderate degree of transaction specificity (Ring & Van de 
Ven 1992). The duration of these contracts is relatively short and the parties 
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feel legally equal in the relationship. The parties may consider forming closer 
and longer-term relationships. Within recurrent contracting, it is most often 
the neoclassical contract that provides the legal framework for exchanges 
(Ring & Van de Ven 1992). The relational contracting mode often involves 
long-term investments, which are the result of repeated bargaining between 
equal and autonomous parties regarding, for example, production and 
property rights. Products and services are often developed and exchanged 
jointly, which requires a high level of specific investments that cannot always 
be specified and controlled by the parties in advance. It also means that the 
parties are exposed to many trading hazards, unlike parties in exchanges that 
rely on the market or hierarchy governance structure. Disputes in a relational 
contract are resolved through internal mechanisms aimed at maintaining the 
relationship and ensuring both efficiency and equitable outcomes from the 
long-term relationship. Here, the governance is bilateral (Ring & Van de Ven 
1992). Ring and Van de Ven (1992) assume the above-mentioned concepts of 
risk and trust to be separate. Additionally, they utilize the open and 
trustworthy assumption contrary to an opportunist, in such a way that it is a) 
possible to define how companies build trust through recurrent contracts and 
b) possible to examine the benefits of long-term use of distinctive assets 
through relational contracts compared to a hierarchy structure. Finally, it is 
assumed that if contracts are agreed upon based on trustworthiness, the parties 
will be less worried about contract implications arising outside of bounded 
rationality. That is, the parties trust one another in terms of whether gaps 
stemming from the unpredictability about the future should be allowed in the 
contract (Ring & Van de Ven 1992). 
 
The uncertainty that may arise regarding the performance of tasks as part of 
continuous cooperation with others, especially when it comes to new or 
difficult tasks, can lead to various forms of risk. These may include financial 
risks, technological risks, risks regarding knowledge and engineering, or risks 
concerning management. Unexpected natural or social events can occur, such 
as earthquakes, union strikes, etc., and these can lead to increased risk, since 
management will have less control over the situation. The same applies to the 
risk of lack of resources. Lack of control can lead to a lack of information, 
which in turn affects the degree of risk faced by the parties. This degree of 
risk will influence the choice of governance structure, which will fall on the 
structure that provides adequate security against risks (Ring & Van de Ven 
1992). 
 
Trustworthiness is important because of the need to work together, even when 
a higher degree of risk means that managers must place greater focus on the 
commercial and financial characteristics of an agreement. Ring and Van de 
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Ven (1992, p. 488) use the definition of trust put forth by (Friedman 1991) —
“confidence in the other's goodwill”—and work from the presumption that 
personal embeddedness at the very least is a necessary condition of trust. Trust 
is based on the norm of equity (Ring & Van de Ven 1992). The equity concept 
was developed as part of exchange theory. It deals with reciprocity within a 
relationship, meaning that one is obliged to give something back for 
something received. Equity deals with fair rates of exchange in terms of costs 
and benefits and is related to distributive justice (Ring & Van de Ven 1992) 
(for elaboration of the equity/distributive justice concept, see Section 2.3.4.). 
The desire of both parties in a relationship to be perceived as trustworthy 
exists because repeated personal interactions between companies encourage 
good and polite behavior and consideration, thus minimizing individual 
opportunism. The greater the dependence on the trusted party, the more the 
level of trust increases. Such an effect can be created by companies by 
following the norms of equity and completing transactions satisfactory (Ring 
& Van de Ven 1992). The risk of information asymmetry decreases when the 
parties have a history of successful transactions. The parties will thus share 
information more freely with one another, and when the parties act regularly 
and repeatedly according to the norms of equity and reciprocity, the risk of 
opportunism will be reduced (Ring & Van de Ven 1992). 
 
In 1994, Ring and Van de Ven proposed their theory of relationship 
development (for any kind of cooperative inter-organizational relationship, 
not just buyer-seller). They structured the theory by relying on Macneil’s 
(1980) theory of relational norms (Jap & Anderson 2007), among others. Ring 
and Van de Ven (1994) state that cooperative inter-organizational 
relationships only emerge, evolve, grow, and dissolve over time because of 
individual activities. In their earlier study, they showed three specific ways in 
which the actions of individuals could influence a relationship (Ring & Van 
de Ven 1992): by defining the degree of uncertainty that may be present in the 
exchange, by specifying the extent to which the parties can rely on 
interpersonal trust to resolve conflicts, and by defining the parties' 
expectations of outcomes, of which efficiency and equity must be present. 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) expanded on this with the added assumption that 
individuals’ views of these issues will be a function of their organizational 
roles, and that role relationships and interpersonal relationships are not 
identical. People often begin an institutionalized (role) relationship before 
they begin to develop the actual personal relationship (Ring & Van de Ven 
1994).  
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Ring and Van de Ven (1994) propose a process framework, in which 
relationship development consists of sequences of negotiation, commitment, 
and execution (see Figure 8). Each cycle through the model comprises a 
number of repeated interactions, where outcomes are assessed in terms of 
efficiency and equity. Even though the temporal occurrence of these phases 
may be almost simultaneous for simple transactions, the duration of each stage 
varies according to the uncertainty of issues involved, the reliance on trust 
among the parties and the role relationships of the parties (Ring & Van de Ven 
1994, p. 97). 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Process Framework of the Development of Cooperative IORs by 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994). 
 
In the negotiation stage, the parties develop joint expectations about their 
motivations, possible investments and perceived uncertainties with regards to 
the business deal they are exploring undertaking jointly. The focus in this 
stage is on formal bargaining processes. Underlying these formal bargaining 
processes are social-psychological processes of sense making, or enactment, 
that lead otherwise independent parties to enter negotiations with one another. 
These processes are often required to provide participants with opportunities 
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to assess the uncertainty associated with the deal, the nature of each party’s 
role, the other’s trustworthiness, their rights and duties, and possible 
efficiency and equity of the transaction as it relates to all parties. In the 
commitment stage, participants reach an agreement on the obligations and 
rules for future action in the relationship. The terms and governance structure 
of the relationship are established in this stage. These agreements are either 
written down in a formal legal contract or informally understood as a 
psychological contract. In the execution stage, the commitments and actions 
are carried out. Initially, the parties’ formally designated role behaviors 
reduce the uncertainty and make interactions among them more predictable. 
After a while, parties may become more familiar with one another and may 
increasingly begin to rely on interpersonal relationships (Ring & Van de Ven 
1994). 
  
Many relationships are lengthy and it can sometimes be difficult to avoid 
misunderstandings, conflicts and changes in expectations between the parties. 
This can lead to renegotiations, and additional agreements are often made to 
address new challenges, while existing agreements remain in effect to help 
maintain the relationship. In the last part of the process, the relationship can 
also dissolve if the business deal is closed and the parties have lived up to 
their promises. This can of course also happen due to breaches of agreements, 
a legal cause, or mutual cancellation. The theory underlying the model’s 
heuristics is a complicated set of informal social-psychological dynamics that 
explain how and why relationships are developed through repeated sequences 
of formal negotiations, commitments and execution (Ring & Van de Ven 
1994). 
 
Frazier, Spekmann and O’Neal 
 
An important point in relationship development and maintenance is how a 
relationship is realized. Frazier, Spekman and O’Neal’s model from 1988 
takes an interesting angle on how buying companies can succeed in having 
their demands implemented by suppliers. This is an essential angle for the 
analysis in present research on sustainable sourcing. The article is based on 
relational exchange and the operational concept “just in time” (JIT) and has 
three specific objectives. The first is to look at the differences between market 
exchange, traditional relational exchange and JIT exchange. As the second 
objective, the authors want to develop a conceptual framework, where the 
focus is on design and processes that may help explain buying companies’ 
degree of interest in and preference for JIT exchanges, but also to consider 
why organizations engage in this specific type of exchange relationship. The 
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third and final objective is to develop a framework containing the factors that 
influence the success/failure of initiated JIT exchange relationships, and to 
examine the question of how exchanges are maintained, dissolved or avoided 
(Frazier et al. 1988). 
 
These objectives lead to the general purpose of the article, which is to expand 
the understanding of exchange relationships between suppliers and buying 
companies (Frazier et al. 1988). The focus of this section is therefore not on 
JIT, but more on the design and processes of implementing a new form of 
cooperation and relationship with a supplier. The part of their model that 
consists of the 'interest stage' and the 'initiation-rejection stage' will not be 
discussed in this section, as these stages are not relevant to sustainability 
compliance. Buyers’ requirements of suppliers regarding sustainability are 
most often not a question of interest, and rejection of sustainability 
requirements is ruled out. 
 
The article distinguishes between market exchange, traditional relational 
exchange and JIT exchange. Market exchange and relational exchange have 
been discussed in the previous sections of this chapter.  Although the JIT 
concept is not essential to this project context, a brief characterization of the 
elements that are essential for starting a new collaboration with new 
requirements will be given.  In relation to the market exchange and traditional 
relational exchange, JIT exchange is more long term. JIT exchange focuses 
on the core product and the values that have been built through close 
coordination between the buyer and supplier. Close cooperation in terms of 
quality, product development, and logistics and the consequently high level 
of communication, are essential in JIT exchange. Since JIT implementation 
requires new policies and procedures, both the supplier and the buyer must 
invest in human assets. The same is true for specific investments that apply 
particularly to the supplier. Such investments can be in new buildings and new 
machinery. Also, a good atmosphere and the will to generate mutual gains are 
essential for the relationship. If bounded rationality and opportunism 
dominate, the costs of JIT exchange will outweigh the benefits. 
 
Even if a JIT exchange has been initiated under appropriate conditions, 
success cannot be guaranteed. Frazier et al. (1988) provide yet another 
framework of processes and structures that contribute to the implementation 
of JIT exchange and whether it is successful or not. The framework consists 
of two steps. First, the implementation step deals with how the buyer and 
supplier work together to achieve a desired output via JIT exchange. The 
second step is the review, which addresses how companies evaluate and react 
to the outcomes arising from JIT exchange. 
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The authors consider three factors that have a direct impact on the exchange 
and the interaction between buyer and supplier from the beginning of the JIT 
exchange: the JIT agreement, the expectations, and the internal sociopolitical 
structure. The more formalized the agreement between buyer and supplier, 
the easier it will be for each party to understand their respective roles and 
responsibilities. The more complex the exchange and the greater the 
interdependence, the more important this agreement is. Also, fairness in the 
agreement is essential, referring to the distribution of benefits and risks 
between buyer and supplier. The fairer an agreement appears, the stronger the 
basis for JIT exchange (Frazier et al. 1988).  Expectations of the buyer and 
supplier regarding liabilities and results will undoubtedly also affect 
communication and behavior in the JIT exchange. Unrealistic expectations of 
performance and results (outcomes) may influence the success of the JIT 
exchange, since such expectations can be difficult to achieve. That is why a 
formalized agreement is appropriate in order to be able to achieve the 
expectations of both the buyer and supplier (Frazier et al. 1988). Many buyers 
choose to establish JIT exchanges with smaller and less powerful suppliers to 
avoid external control. This power imbalance often means that the supplier 
has several more specific investments in durable assets than the buyer. This 
power imbalance in a relationship can weaken cooperation (Frazier et al. 
1988). Dwyer et al. (1987) state that the exercise of avoiding the use of power 
is the most important factor if a relationship is to be successful. The more 
interdependent the companies are, the greater the importance of the judicious 
use of force (Frazier et al. 1988). 
 
Norms develop in an exchange relationship and are a part of the internal 
sociopolitical structure. Given that uncertainty is high when JIT exchange is 
implemented, and given that it is a long-term relationship, the possibility for 
strong norm creation is high. By adopting norms and defining standards of 
behavior, the general rules for future exchanges are made (Dwyer et al. 1987), 
thus improving the chances of success in the exchange. Positive norms are 
developed in a JIT exchange only when 1) the agreement is oriented towards 
self-regulation and is fair, 2) there are many people linked to the JIT exchange 
and the JIT exchange is important for both sides, and 3) expectations are 
realistic, performance reaches a high level and each company uses its power 
in a non-coercive way. If strong positive norms are not developed, it is 
uncertain whether the JIT exchange will survive over time (Frazier et al. 
1988). In JIT exchanges where expectations are unrealistic, the role of 
performance is poor. When coercive power is used and positive norms are not 
developed, cooperation will probably deteriorate and conflicts can arise that 
FROM GOVERNANCE TO SUPPLIER DEVELOPMENT 
70 
 
can hinder the success of the JIT exchange. In addition to changes in outcomes 
associated with JIT exchange, a very important key benefit that contributes to 
the success of a JIT exchange is the level of trust developed between the buyer 
and supplier. As previously mentioned, trust is a very important element in 
any exchange, but especially in a JIT exchange, because of the investments 
and commitment required from both sides (Frazier et al. 1988). 
 
An important element in the final stage of the model, the review, is the 
performance appraisal system. It is important that such a system be well 
defined in relation to the criteria by which companies judge one another. This 
allows for more careful evaluation. Another important point in the 
performance evaluation is the equity of the JIT exchange. Equity is measured 
by comparing each company's rewards or outputs relative to its inputs 
(investments and costs). When the average of the outputs relative to inputs are 
seen as being similar for each company, the exchange is perceived as equitable 
(Frazier et al. 1988). In order for a JIT exchange to be successful, it is 
necessary to have a high degree of equity and satisfaction (Frazier et al. 1988). 
In summary, the article by Frazier et al. (1988) provides a clear picture of what 
to consider when new forms of cooperation are to be implemented. 
Furthermore, the article shows the importance of the relationship between 
buyer and supplier in implementing a new approach or new requirements, and 
in getting away from the traditional, price-driven focus of buying companies, 
which can be an obstacle to the implementation of new initiatives. 
 
2.3.6. THEORETICAL RECAP OF RELATIONSHIP 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
The essential concern of this thesis is whether buying companies, in their 
relationship with suppliers, are able to get those suppliers to meet demands 
for sustainability compliance. In this issue, it is important to look at the 
relationship itself and not necessarily the individual parties or transactions 
(Ford 2002). Developing and maintaining such a relationship in connection 
with the new requirements regarding sustainability is of great importance for 
both parties, particularly when there is an existing close relationship between 
buyer and supplier. The four relationship development models discussed 
above frame the development processes and phases, and point out underlying 
requirements for parties that are crucial to whether the relationship will 
achieve success. 
The models describe each phase a relationship needs to pass through to evolve 
into more advanced joint value creation initiatives. In the case of this thesis, 
the development focus is on the sustainability-related aspect of the buyer-
supplier relationship, with a focus on sustainability initiatives. Some of the 
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phases are similar between models, but with different names. Phases or 
individual elements such as communication, expectations, negotiation, 
expansion, commitment, execution and dissolution (Dwyer et al. 1987; 
Frazier et al. 1988; Ring & Van de Ven 1992, 1994) are all important. When 
purchasing companies place new demands on suppliers—in this case, 
regarding sustainability compliance—a matching of expectations is 
important, and close cooperation around sense-making and enactments is 
essential for supplier sustainability compliance (Frazier et al. 1988). Factors 
such as trust, fairness, norms and equity are crucial in these phases, but also 
fundamental to the overall relationship. If trust and expectations between the 
parties do not match the positive norms, which are essential, a close 
relationship will not be formed. Without trust and positive norms, it is 
uncertain whether the requirements for development initiatives, including 
sustainability compliance, will be met. The same applies for the factor of 
equity. In every exchange, there is an expectation regarding equity, and this 
expectation is evident when it comes to sustainability. It is therefore 
important, both for the parties and for the sustainability-related exchange, that 
a high degree of equity and satisfaction is present in the relationship. If the 
phases of the models are reviewed and factors such as trust, norms and equity 
are applied, the relationship can evolve. Especially from a sustainability 
perspective, if and how suppliers work with the buying company around 
sustainability issues is essential. Relational norms are one of many 
governance mechanisms used to regulate relationships between firms (Heide 
& John 1992; Williamson 1975). The relational norms are of great importance 
in the buyer-supplier relationship, especially when trying to accomplish 
supplier sustainability compliance. Based on their importance for relationship 
development and for the success of joint value-creating initiatives, the 
concepts of norms and equity have been chosen as the main foci for the 
empirical part of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGICAL 
APPROACH 
This doctoral thesis aims to explore and explain the underlying mechanisms 
present in the relationship between buyer and supplier with regards to 
sustainability compliance requirements stipulated by buying companies. 
Furthermore, the aim is to analyze suppliers’ perception of their relationship 
with the buying company and to analyze the effects these underlying 
mechanisms might have on the relationship and hence on the suppliers' ability 
to meet the sustainability-related requirements. This chapter will explain how 
the thesis will achieve those aims and will present the methodological 
background of the study and any related considerations. The chapter begins 
by describing the paradigmatic grounding of the thesis, including a short 
overview of general paradigmatic views on research and the paradigm chosen 
for this thesis. Second, the methodological view and research design are 
presented, providing the framework for the collection and analysis of data. An 
introduction to the methods and techniques for data collection is also 
presented. Next, an elaboration of how the data was transformed into findings 
is provided, and finally, the validity and reliability of the study are discussed.  
 
3.1. RESEARCH PARADIGM 
 
In this section, I will explain the standpoint of the thesis in relation to the 
philosophy of science. As the thesis is within the social science arena, I will 
start by giving an overview of three overarching philosophies of science 
(Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009) that provide a basic understanding and 
acknowledgement of the variety and tension existing in social science 
research. The three philosophies are positivism, social constructivism and 
critical realism. The focus will be on the ontology and epistemology within 
the philosophies, as they are the determinants of good science. In simple 
terms, ontology is the nature of reality (Hudson & Ozanne 1988). Ontology is 
associated with a central question of whether social entities need to be 
perceived as objective or subjective. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge 
and deals with questions concerning the nature, scope, and sources of 
knowledge and how this reality is captured or known. After the presentation 
of the three philosophies, the underlying reasons for choosing critical realism 
for this thesis are elaborated.  
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3.1.1. POSITIVISM 
 
The ontological position of positivism is one of realism. Realism is the view 
that objects have an existence independent of the knower. Thus, a 
discoverable reality exists independently of the researcher (Scotland 2012). 
The positivist epistemology is one of objectivism. Positivists go forth into the 
world impartially, discovering absolute knowledge about an objective reality, 
and they assume that only when using “facts” derived through the scientific 
method can one make a legitimate claim to knowledge. Here, the researcher 
and the researched are independent entities (Scotland 2012). 
 
The concept of ‘positivism’ has been central in the philosophy-of-science 
debate since the beginning of the nineteenth century and through the twentieth 
century (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009). The scientists of positivism, both in 
the classical positivism of the 18th century and the logical positivism of the 
20th century, are of the opinion that observations and findings are neutral, 
without prerequisites, and value-free, and that it is possible through the use of 
various methodological safeguards to ensure neutral findings or observations 
(Kempster & Parry 2011). Data and facts, according to positivism, should be 
observable and already exist. In modern positivism, what is observable also 
includes what is measurable or possible to register through some kind of 
instrument (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009). According to positivism, it is a 
requirement that scientific theories be confirmed based on objective 
observations of reality. Science should only deal with what is able to be the 
object of direct observation. Positivism aims to remove all uncertain 
knowledge. This implies sacred writings, religious revelations or theories 
created from human intuition are discarded. Science is built only based on 
facts that we, in all reasonable probability, deem safe. Positivism does not 
trust the traditions and authorities, who tend to indulge in uninformed 
speculation. Positivism has two sources of cognition: observations and logic 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg 2009). Observations are the information obtained 
from the human five senses; these form the basis of the empirical cognition. 
Positivism relies not only on senses, however, but also on having a critical 
basic setting of the world. A positivist will examine the findings and then 
decide whether the perceptions can be considered valid. Those facts deemed 
safe must be analyzed logically to draw conclusions. The extreme version of 
positivism is called radical positivism. Researchers who subscribe to this 
philosophy are convinced that there is an absolute truth, and that it is possible 
to find it. 
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3.1.2. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
Constructivism is based on a relativist (as opposed to realist) ontology and it 
means that constructivism is based on the notion that the truth about ‘what is 
what’ is socially negotiated. The shared feature of all forms of constructivism 
is that they do not focus on an ontological reality, but instead on a constructed 
reality. Constructivism is based on a subjectivist (as opposed to objectivist) 
epistemology (Guba & Lincoln 1994). Social constructivism is thus a very 
broad and multi-faceted perspective, and furthermore has often been 
contrasted to, compared to, and seen as an alternative to, positivism and 
critical realism. For social constructivism, reality—or at least selected parts 
thereof—is not something naturally given. The study of how reality is socially 
constructed therefore becomes crucial for social constructivists (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2009). Social constructivists see knowledge and truth as social 
constructions, as opposed to created. A social structure is typically defined as 
a socially created perception (Andrews 2012). Social constructivists believe 
that even existed an objective world separate from humans’ perception of it, 
people could never achieve neutral knowledge of this world. We have no way 
for our recognition apparatus to grasp the world as such. People perceive the 
world through language and concepts (Collin 1999). However, the 
interpretation we apply to the world is never neutral. It is socially created, and 
includes our values regarding what is good and what is bad. As Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) describe, we then create an interpretation of the world 
through interaction knowledge. Social constructivism emphasizes that the 
construction of individual as well as organizational identity is relational; all 
identity construction takes place in relation to ‘the other’ (Esmark et al. 2005). 
 
3.1.3. CRITICAL REALISM 
 
The English philosopher Roy Bhaskar, who is considered the founder of 
critical realism, began developing the approach in the 1970s. Critical realism 
is intended to provide a philosophical grounding for science as well as an 
alternative to the positivist and constructivist approaches (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2009). Realism’s philosophical starting point is, as previously 
mentioned, the existence of a reality independent of our knowledge of it. 
Critical realism’s overall epistemological and ontological starting point is that 
there is a reality that works independently of the concepts the researcher uses 
to describe it (Danermark et al. 2002). 
Critical realism indicates epistemologically more clearly than the other 
positions the appropriate direction and context of explanatory research—
“from the manifest phenomena to the mechanisms that produce them, in their 
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complex co-determination” (Bhaskar & Danermark 2006, p.280). Thus, 
critical realism is not only the ontologically least restrictive perspective, but 
it is also the epistemologically most heuristically suggestive one. By trying to 
identify the deeper underlying mechanisms that generate empirical 
phenomena (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009), critical realism implies a shift 
from epistemology to ontology, and within ontology, a shift from events to 
mechanisms (Bhaskar 1975). Sayer (2000) describes the characteristics of 
critical realism based on five different angles: 1) the intransitive and transitive 
dimensions of knowledge, 2) the real, the actual, and the empirical, 3) 
stratification and emergence, 4) causation and 5) the interpretive or 
hermeneutic dimension. 
 
The intransitive and transitive dimensions of knowledge 
 
Critical realists argue that it is not possible to reduce the world to observable 
objects and facts (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2009). There is a world independent 
of our knowledge of it, and this world or reality is not immediately given and 
empirically available (Danermark 2002). Thus, there is also knowledge that 
can be subject to analysis. This is what critical realists describe as the 
intransitive dimension—the object of scientific enquiry. The objects of the 
intransitive dimension do not change concurrently with scientific 
understanding of them (Buch-Hansen & Nielsen 2005). As Sayer (2000) 
explains, the change from the perception of the Earth as flat to the perception 
that it is round was not accompanied by a change in the Earth's shape. 
 
Our knowledge of reality consists of our theories, models, concepts, data, 
descriptions, ideas, etc., all of which form the transitive dimension. Bhaskar 
describes transitive objects as the raw material of scientists (cited in Buch-
Hansen & Nielsen 2014) and knowledge that has already been produced as an 
indispensable means to produce new knowledge (Bhaskar 1998). The 
transitive dimension is socially determined and changeable. It applies to all 
knowledge (Danermark et al. 2002). Danermark et al. (2002) emphasize that 
the special order of social science compared to natural science is that it seeks 
knowledge of a socially produced reality, not just a socially defined one. This 
understanding differs from naive realism or objectivism, which assumes that 
we, in principle, have a correct and objective picture of reality. It differs also 
from over-emphasizing the transitive side as per constructivism and 
relativism, which argue that it is not meaningful to assert that a statement 
about reality is more probable than another statement, since all knowledge is 
“socially determined” (Danermark et al. 2002, p. 200). 
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As part of the social world, transitive objects also become objects of study. 
This means that knowledge has two dimensions—the transitive and the 
intransitive (Danermark et al. 2002). Rival theories have different transitive 
objects (theories about the world), while the world they are trying to 
comprehend—that is, the intransitive dimension—is the same (Andersen 
2007). Reality exists independent of researchers’ ideas and description of it. 
 
The real, the actual and the empirical 
 
Critical realism distinguishes between three overlapping areas of reality—the 
empirical, the actual and the real. The empirical area includes that which we 
can observe—things that happen and exist according to our immediate 
experience. The actual is constituted by all the things that happen 
independently, whether or not they are observed, and the real includes those 
mechanisms that are productive and generate power (Danermark 2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Domain levels by Bhaskar (1975). 
 
The term “mechanism” is central to critical realism and can loosely be defined 
as that which is capable of making things happen in the world (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg 2009). When mechanisms are producing an event, either observed 
or not, it falls into the actual domain (Danermark et al. 2002). When such an 
event is experienced, it becomes an empirical fact and falls within the 
empirical domain (Figure 9). Science about social reality therefore cannot be 
reduced to empirical events or the empirical domain. However, the real world 
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seems flat without ontological depth. Therefore, if we want to learn about 
underlying causal mechanisms, we must turn our attention to such 
mechanisms and not away from the empirical observable events (Danermark 
et al. 2002). 
 
Stratification and emergence 
 
In critical realism, entities may be analyzed at a number of different levels of 
aggregation. A crucial critical realist assumption concerns the existence of 
emergence in such situations (Easton 2010). The distinction between the real, 
the actual and the empirical suggests a stratified ontology. Here, reality is 
assumed to consist of hierarchically ordered strata, where the lower strata 
create the order for higher strata and the higher strata are not determined by 
the lower strata (Danermark 2002; Moll 2004). Each stratum has its own 
mechanisms, and it is the existence of these stratum-specific mechanisms that 
make up the stratum. Some of the more important strata are social sciences, 
psychological sciences, biological sciences and molecular sciences, and many 
attempts have been made to describe the different strata (Danermark 2002). 
The strata are related to one another because each has its own emergent 
powers, as implied by the ability of the various strata to create new 
mechanisms. Social phenomena can be explained with reference to 
psychological mechanisms, but as a whole, social phenomena are produced 
by social powers (Danermark et al. 2002). Which mechanisms we choose to 
concentrate on are determined by what our object of study is. This also means 
that a single theory by itself can rarely explain all the different phenomena 
being looked at. Depending on the aim of the study, several theoretical 
perspectives and approaches may be required (Danermark et al. 2002). 
 
Causation 
 
As previously mentioned, critical realism involves an ontological switch from 
events to mechanisms. This switch means changing the attention to what 
actually produces the events and not just to the events themselves (Danermark 
et al. 2002). Behind all events, there exist powers that generate the events; 
these powers form part of the basis of critical realism (Fig. 10). This implies 
that the most fundamental task of science is to find the intrinsic mechanisms 
that generate events. These intrinsic properties are called causalities. Reality 
is full of such causative forces, and they exist whether identified or not. 
Critical realism thus starts from the basic assumption that objects in reality 
possess causal powers or generative mechanisms (Danermark et al. 2002). 
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Figure 10: Critical realist view of causation by Sayer (2000, p. 15). 
 
One of the main objectives of critical realism is explanation; answering the 
questions “What caused those events to happen?” and “What produces, 
generates, creates or determines the effect?” produces simple causal 
descriptions (Sayer 2000). In Figure 11, causal explanation is structured in 
terms of the relationships among the concepts discussed above. Figure 11 
illustrates the formal statement produced by the critical realist structure of 
explanation. Objects having structures and necessarily possessing causal 
powers and liabilities (the mechanisms) will, under specific conditions, result 
in an event (Easton 2010).  
 
 
 
Figure 11: The structure of causal explanation by Sayer (1992, p. 109). 
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In practice, this means that to explain causality and events, it is necessary to 
adopt another form of inference in critical realism “by postulating (and 
identifying) mechanisms (liabilities and powers), which are capable of 
producing them” (Sayer 1992, p. 107). This inference, which can be described 
as a "thought operation" (Danermark et al. 2002), is also called retroduction 
(Bhaskar 1975). Retroduction is a different form of inference from the more 
common induction and deduction. Where induction has its focus on deriving 
general statements from an experience, deduction works the other way; given 
a law or general claim, the deductivist can develop a concrete statement about 
a particular situation (Olsen 2009). Retroduction enables the researcher to 
move between knowledge of empirical phenomena expressed through events 
to the development of explanations of ways that hold ‘ontological depth’ and 
potentially provides indications of the existence of unobservable entities 
(Zachariadis et al. 2013, p. 4). This makes it possible to understand how things 
could be different, for example, if the mechanisms did not interact as they do 
(Zachariadis et al. 2013). The process of retroduction means ‘moving 
backwards’ and it asks, “What must be true in order to make this event 
possible?” Abduction is a closely related process to retroduction (Easton 
2010). 
 
The interpretive or hermeneutic dimension 
 
Critical realism views meaning as something that is understood and that 
cannot be measured or counted (Sayer 2000, p. 17). Critical realists 
acknowledge the value of interpretivism, which focuses on discourse, human 
perception and motivation, as human reasons can serve as causal explanations. 
In the case of interpretivism, critical realism shares the same view that social 
phenomena are concept-dependent and require interpretive understanding 
(Roy Bhaskar 1998; Sayer 2000). 
 
Social research can use the same methods as natural science to explain causal 
relationships, but can also go beyond those by using 'verstehen' or interpretive 
understanding. While natural scientists must necessarily join their scientific 
community's hermeneutic circle, social scientists join the double hermeneutic 
circle representing the understandings of both the scientific community and 
their individual field of study (Sayer 2000). 
 
3.1.4. CRITICAL REALISM AND THE THESIS 
 
When deciding which paradigm to adopt, the researcher's own perception of 
reality is in focus. Therefore, it is relevant to start this paragraph with an 
introduction to my conceptualization of reality. To do this, I make the 
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following claims: 1) I believe that reality exists independent of my own 
observations and knowledge (Ontology). 2) I believe in empirical study, but I 
am not able, through such study, to guarantee or present perfect and 100% 
objective knowledge (Epistemology). 3) I believe that all methods, both 
qualitative and quantitative, are suitable for research, but the use of these 
depends on the specific study (Methodology). These views generally lead to 
the philosophical standpoint applied in this study, which is critical realism 
(Figure 12). To further support this choice, I refer to Easton (1998, 2002,  
2010), who explicitly recommends the critical realism paradigm for case 
studies of business relationships. 
 
 Ontology Epistemology  Methodology 
Positivism Reality 
exists and 
can be 
understood 
Objectivist; findings 
true 
Experimental/ 
manipulative; verification 
of hypothesis; mainly 
quantitative methods 
Constructionism Relativist, 
Local and 
specific 
Constructed 
realities 
Transactional/ 
subjectivist;  
created findings 
Hermeneutic/dialectic; 
mainly qualitative 
methods 
Critical realism Reality exist 
indepen-
dently of the 
researcher 
Knowledge is 
fallible,  
possible to develop 
reliable knowledge 
and achieve 
progress in 
knowledge 
Both quantitative and 
qualitative - but inclined 
generally toward 
qualitative methods 
Figure 12: Philosophical standpoint applicable for this study, adapted from 
Alvesson and Sköldberg (2009) and Buch-Hansen and Nielsen (2005). 
 
The overarching objective of social science research is to explain social 
conditions. From a critical realist perspective, this means that the properties 
and causal mechanisms that generate and enable events should be described, 
together with how different mechanisms are reflected in specific 
circumstances. The basic scientific problem is: What produces a specific 
event? The job is to seek to identify generative mechanisms and determine 
how they are expressed and how they lead to concrete events and processes 
(Danermark et al. 2002). The critical realism approach is thus suited to the 
study’s aim of exploring and explaining the underlying mechanisms present 
in the relationship between buying company and supplier when supplier 
sustainability compliance is required. Furthermore, critical realism enables 
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the analysis of the relational effects of the mechanisms, and hence allows an 
analysis of the suppliers' ability to meet sustainability-related requirements. 
 
Within the ontology of critical realism, a switch from events to mechanisms 
is involved, meaning a change in focus to what produces the events and not 
just the events themselves (Danermark et al. 2002). The two research 
problems in this thesis are designed to look for the powers and mechanisms 
that generate the events being studied, that is, they are searching for a causal 
explanation for supplier sustainability compliance challenges non-compliance 
and compliance. The thesis does not attempt to explain the events themselves, 
but is searching for what actually produces those events. An illustration of the 
structure of causal events in this thesis can be found in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: The structure of causal explanation in this thesis, adapted from 
Sayer (1992). 
 
The events in question—sustainability-related supplier compliance or lack 
thereof, as well as the challenges that come with buyers' demands for 
sustainability—were present in the actual domain even before being looked at 
in this study. The purpose of the case studies in this thesis is to experience 
these events through supplier interviews, placing them in the empirical 
domain. Since science is about social reality, we cannot look at and examine 
empirical events in the empirical domain only. We must analyze these 
empirical events to determine the underlying causal mechanisms. This logic 
of inference, which could be better described as “thought operation” 
(Danermark et al. 2002) or retroduction (Bhaskar 1975), involves reflexivity 
about theoretical positioning and recurrent iterative movement between 
theory end empirical evidence (Oliver, 2011). 
In critical realism, theory is defined as a conceptual context that has an 
explanatory purpose and which can be used to understand the observable and 
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to fill the 'gap' between the three ontological domains—the real, the actual and 
the empirical. Therefore, the theoretical dimension constitutes a central part 
of this thesis, as the theory should help to create meaning and understanding 
in the analysis of the empirical data (Danermark et al. 2002). In the thesis, 
theory will be used in a dynamic optic, where theory and concepts are 
continually analyzed in various papers through an interpretivist empirical 
cognition, together with the elaboration of the theories and discussion hereof 
in the thesis cover. It is not enough to ask what the theory says about the 
empirical data; it is also necessary to ask what the empirical data says about 
the theory (Danermark et al. 2002). Through the papers, an ongoing 
interaction between the empirical and the theory is obtained. 
 
3.2. METHODOLOGICAL VIEW 
 
Sayer (cited in Easton 2010) argues that critical realism is relatively tolerant 
with respect to different research methods. Danermark et al. (2002, p. 150) 
calls “the congruence between the object of study, the assumptions about 
society and the conceptions of how knowledge is possible, and one’s choice 
of design and method” practical logic. Critical realism assumes that social 
science studies are conducted in open systems, that reality consists of different 
strata with emergent powers, and that facts are theory laden. These are all 
factors that affect the choice of design and method (Danermark et al. 2002). 
A wide range of research methods can be used together in critical realism, in 
contrast to positivism and constructivism (Easton 2010), but “the particular 
choices should depend on the nature of the object of study and what one wants 
to learn about it” (Sayer 2000, p.19). 
 
3.2.1. RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
The research approach refers to the “plans and the procedures for research 
that span steps from broad assumptions to detailed methods of data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation” (Creswell 2014, p. 3). In this process of 
designing and planning the research, the researcher has the option to choose 
between a qualitative research approach, a quantitative research approach, or 
a mix of the two, often referred to as the mixed methods research approach 
(Creswell 2014). The quantitative paradigm is based on positivist 
perspectives; it is crucial to have the ability to quantify, thus allowing the 
researcher to determine the frequency of occurrence of the studied 
phenomenon. Quantitative studies can include surveys with closed response 
categories, field observations with fixed observation schedules, and 
interviews with closed questions. Qualitative methods are linked to 
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constructivism, the hermeneutic and phenomenological understanding of 
science. With this approach, the researcher is more concerned with creating 
and overarching meaning, including the context of the studied phenomenon, 
through understanding and interpretation. This makes soft data important; 
such data frequently consists of linguistic statements that are not 
predetermined. Qualitative methods can include interviews, case studies, 
document studies, and field observations. None of these research approaches 
are intrinsically superior, as each research approach has its own advantages 
and disadvantages. 
Compared with positivism and constructivism/hermeneutics, critical realism 
is compatible with a relatively wide range of research methods, including 
qualitative, ethnographic and quantitative approaches. This means, however, 
as stated by Sayer (1992), that the choice between methods is based on the 
nature of the object studied, and what we want to know about it. Therefore, a 
great deal depends on how the field of research is defined and how we 
conceptualize the central objects of study (Sayer 1992). 
As previously mentioned, the present thesis aims to explore, identify and 
explain the underlying governance structures and mechanisms used in the 
sustainability-related sourcing process between buying company and supplier. 
Furthermore, the aim is to analyze the effects these governance structures and 
mechanisms have on suppliers’ perception of the relationship, and hence, on 
the suppliers' ability to meet sustainability requirements. To achieve these 
aims requires in-depth knowledge of the studied phenomenon and events. 
Thus, a qualitative research design is suitable for this study (Ellram 1996). 
Furthermore, qualitative research can generate further insights into the 
nuances of relationship practice and supplier perceptions (Kern & Willcocks 
2002). 
3.2.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
According to Sayer (1992), there are two broad types of research designs: 
extensive and intensive. These are comparable to quantitative and qualitative 
methods, respectively. Research design is the type of inquiry chosen from the 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches. For this thesis, the 
qualitative method has been chosen, and the appropriate type of study must 
be decided to provide the specific direction for procedures in the research 
design. The research design defines the structure of the inquiry and has an 
influence on how the data are collected and on the data analysis (Creswell 
2014). As stated by De Vaus (1993, p. 9), “the function of a research design 
is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial 
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question as unambiguously as possible.” Thus, when designing the research, 
we must ask what type of evidence is needed to answer the research question 
in a convincing way (De Vaus 1993). There are many different research 
designs to choose from, such as experiments, social surveys, field 
work/ethnography, longitudinal studies, action research and case studies 
(Blaikie 2009), and the choice of design depends on the situation, as they all 
have their own set of strengths and weaknesses. Also, from a critical realism 
perspective, the research question is a crucial starting point. Critical realism 
argues that the question must be designed in relation to what caused the events 
associated with the phenomenon (Easton, 2010 p. 123). In this study, the 
events consist of the non-compliance actions of suppliers who find it 
troublesome to comply with buying companies’ sustainability requirements. 
Furthermore, Yin (2003, p. 5) states, as displayed in Table 6, that three 
conditions distinguish research strategies from one another: a) the type of 
research question posed, b) the extent of control an investigator has over 
actual behavioral events, and c) the degree of focus on contemporary as 
opposed to historical events. 
 
Table 6: Relevant situation for different research strategies by Yin (2003, p. 
5) 
Strategy Form of 
research 
question 
Requires control 
of behavioral 
events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary 
events 
Experiment how, why? yes yes 
Survey who, what, 
where, how 
many, how 
much? 
no yes 
Archival 
analysis 
who, what, 
where, how 
many, how 
much? 
no yes/no 
History how, why? no no 
Case Study how, why? no yes 
 
In this thesis, two research problems have been drawn up that consist of both 
what and how questions. Furthermore, the study focuses on contemporary 
events that occur every day in the sustainability-related sourcing process 
between buying companies and suppliers, whom the researcher has no control 
over. 
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Based on this background, a case study design was chosen as the structure of 
the inquiry, as this method is appropriate for the exploratory and explanatory 
phases of an inquiry (Ellram 1996; Yin 1994). Furthermore, the case study is 
very well suited for acquiring generalizable knowledge about structures and 
mechanisms, and is thereby a very important feature of social science founded 
on critical realism (Danermark et al. 2002). Yin (1994, p. 13) defines a case 
study as 
“an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident.” 
Case studies are not necessarily limited to the use of a single research method, 
but may include the use of several methods, such as field observations, 
interviews and questionnaires. Eisenhardt (1989, p. 534) states that “the case 
study is a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics 
present within single settings.” And as a research strategy, the case study can 
be used in several ways to provide knowledge of phenomena related to 
individuals, organizations, politics, etc. (Yin 2003). The purpose of the 
method is to analyze a specific case and gain general knowledge through the 
analysis. Within social science, a case study can look at a particular company, 
an organization or a relationship (Easton 2010). The purpose of the case study 
is to provide a practical and concrete illustration of specific problems within 
the studied area. 
Yin (2003) suggests four types of designs for case studies in a 2x2 matrix 
(Figure 13): single case (holistic) design, single case (embedded) design, 
multiple case (holistic) design, and multiple case (embedded) design. The 
holistic case study has one unit of analysis, while the embedded may have a 
sub-unit or a number of sub-units. The dotted lines between the case and the 
context show that the boundaries between the two are not likely to be sharp in 
any of the four designs (Yin 2003). The existence of a phenomenon can be 
described by a single case study, but a stronger base for theory building and 
elaboration is provided by multiple case studies, and multiple case studies also 
enable broader exploration of research questions (Eisenhardt & Graebner 
2007; Yin 2003). 
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Figure 13: Basic types of Designs for case studies by Yin (2003, p. 40). 
 
Dul & Hak (2008) state that multiple case studies are in fact a type of single 
case study and may consist of comparative case studies, parallel case studies 
and serial single-case studies. In a comparative case study, data from two or 
more cases are compared. In a parallel case study, cases are selected at the 
same time to study the same assumptions in each case without taking the 
results from one case into the other.  In serial single-case studies, the results 
from one case are taken into account for the next one. Results from several 
case studies are often considered to be more convincing than results from a 
single case study, and this reduces the risk of researcher bias (Voss et al. 
2002). Conclusions are stronger if the same explanations are found in several 
cases (de Vaus, 2006). In the present study, the broad objective is to explore 
and explain suppliers’ perception of sustainability-related buyer requirements 
and the challenges concerning compliance, in order to identify causal 
mechanisms underlying compliance, non-compliance, and challenges. 
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Therefore, the multiple parallel single-case study design has been chosen for 
this study to generate a wide foundation about supplier perceptions and to 
thereby be able to draw conclusions. The case studies are not named as case 
studies in the individual papers but as interviews. 
3.2.3. UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND CASE IDENTIFICATION AND 
SELECTION  
 
Selection or sampling of cases is an important aspect in a multiple case study 
design (Eisenhardt 1989). It is essential to define the unit of analysis before 
selecting cases, and it is possible to select between different units of analysis, 
such as individuals, organizations, events, decisions or time periods (De Vaus 
2001). Yin (2003) states that “the tentative definition of the unit of analysis 
(and therefore the case) is related to the way you have defined your initial 
research questions.” 
 
The overall unit of analysis for this study is the relationship between buyer 
and supplier. However, each paper has different units of analysis, focusing on 
both the buying companies and the suppliers. Although the unit of analysis in 
the papers is primarily the supplier, the emergent data is focused on the 
suppliers’ relationship with the buying companies. A critical realist approach 
underpins the research design, as this argues that to understand a social 
phenomenon, research on it must record and analyze events and experiences 
of the actors within it (Easton 2010).  
In case studies, a sample of cases is built by selecting cases according to 
different criteria (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). Miles and Huberman (1994) 
state that two actions are involved in sampling. The first is to set boundaries 
defining what you can study; this action is connected directly to the research 
question. The second action is to create a sample frame that will help to 
confirm, uncover, or qualify the basic processes or constructs underpinning 
the study (Voss et al. 2002). The qualitative sampling for this study is theory 
driven ‘up front’ and not progressive, as in grounded theory (Miles & 
Huberman 1994). This was the most appropriate strategy due to geographical, 
economic and time constraints. 
 
First, the cases were chosen from the textile and apparel industry; this was 
done for several reasons. One reason is that sustainability sourcing has been 
an important focus area in this industry for many years (Börjeson et al. 2014; 
Jastram & Schneider 2015), and therefore the industry provides a good 
opportunity to investigate the phenomenon of interest. At the same time, 
supplier sustainability-related challenges are widespread in the industry, as 
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
89 
 
shown by many examples from both research and practice (Perry & Towers 
2013). The focus here is specifically on Bangladesh, China, and India, which 
are three of the world’s largest textile and apparel exporting nations (World 
Trade Organisation 2016). The author of this thesis has a large network in the 
textile and apparel industry, established through many years of practice in the 
industry and by belonging to an educational institution specializing entirely 
in this industry. This network was used in the selection of the individual cases. 
Suppliers appeared in an equal number for each country in the study. Due to 
the aforementioned time, geographical and economic aspects, ten case 
companies of different sizes, ages and specializations from each country were 
selected in advance. Each case is a textile or apparel manufacturer with 
exports. Some sites consist entirely of garmenting (that is, cutting and the 
sewing process) and others are composite factories that perform all industry 
processes, from spinning, knitting and weaving, to dyeing and garmenting. 
The key informant from each case possessed extensive knowledge about the 
sustainability area and the related requirements from the customers, and all 
key informants were promised anonymity, both personally and company-
wise. 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) provide relevant criteria for evaluating 
qualitative sampling strategies to help justify the rigor of qualitative research, 
as the sampling is crucial for later analysis. These criteria are suggested in the 
form of six different attributes. In Table 7, the sampling strategy of this study 
is evaluated using the six criteria. 
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Table 7: Relevance of the criteria proposed by Miles and Huberman to 
selection of samples in this thesis case studies, Adapted from Curtis et al. 
(2000) 
 
3.2.4. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
The following section describes how the data that form the basis of this study 
were collected. For this thesis, data were collected through semi-structured 
interviews. The strength of this method is that it is highly flexible (Easton 
2010). Kvale and Brinkman (2009, p. 19) define the semi-structured interview 
as “an interview that aims to obtain descriptions of the interviewee's life-
world in order to interpret the meaning of the phenomena described.” The 
Sampling parameters   
(Miles and Huberman’s 
criteria) 
30 supplier cases  
MH1:  
The sampling strategy 
should be relevant to the 
conceptual framework and 
the research questions 
addressed by the research  
Yes, based on pre-existing theory and research 
problems 
MH2:  
The sample should be likely 
to generate rich information 
on the type of phenomena 
which need to be studied. 
Yes, three different countries with specific 
sustainability related relevance. 
Key informant with sustainability specialized 
knowledge. 
 
MH3:  
The sample should enhance 
the `generalizability' of the 
findings. 
Yes, 30 supplier cases with different sizes, age 
and specialization. 
 
MH4:  
The sample should produce 
believable 
descriptions/explanations (in 
the sense of being true to 
real life). 
Yes, Key informant special sustainability and 
customer knowledge. 
Anonymity  
The researcher had no company reference 
 
MH5:  
Is the sample strategy 
ethical?  
 
Yes, informants were promised anonymity  
before interviews 
MH6:  
Is the sampling plan 
feasible? 
Yes, compared to time, economy and practical 
geographical issues. 
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semi-structured interview is suitable when it is desirable to adopt an 
explorative approach that can generate new knowledge, describe a 
phenomenon and concentrate on the interactions of the various complex 
mechanisms that cause the observed events (Zachariadis et al. 2010). 
 
Using the author’s aforementioned personal network, interviewees from the 
supplier organizations were chosen. All interviewees were involved in all 
aspects of exchange with their customers. They had a high level of knowledge 
about sustainability and customers, and all held executive positions in the 
company. For the 30 interviews, a semi-structured interview guide was 
created and the interviews were conducted personally by the author. All 
questions were worded as broadly as possible about a variety of topics, which 
gave the interviewees the opportunity to express their observations and what 
they felt and did in connection with the studied subject. In each interview there 
was also room for discussion of issues that were not covered in the interview 
protocol but that the participants nonetheless found relevant (Yin 2003). All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. All the interviewees were 
promised beforehand that personal names and company names would be kept 
anonymous. By doing this, it was possible to gain insights into how the 
suppliers perceive, react to, and are affected by buying companies’ 
sustainability-related requirements. After each interview, a guided tour of the 
production facilities was taken by the author. 
It should be mentioned that, in addition to the interviews with the 30 suppliers, 
the author also conducted interviews with one of the largest apparel 
companies in Denmark at that time. There were three interviews with the 
director of social corporate responsibility and two interviews with the 
company’s sourcing manager. Furthermore, two additional interviews, with 
the managing director and another with a merchandiser in the company’s 
purchasing office in Shanghai, were conducted. Unfortunately, due to major 
organizational changes in the company the cooperation was discontinued and 
the collected data is not used in this thesis. 
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Table 8: Selected case suppliers. (I=India, B=Bangladesh, C=China), (also 
applied in the paper “Supplier Perceptions of Distributive Justice in 
Sustainable Apparel Sourcing”). 
 
 
 
 
3.2.5. METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
 
As the approach to data analysis was relatively different for each paper, this 
section will account for the overall and general analytical method used. The 
specific methods of analysis are elaborated in the individual papers. As 
previously mentioned, instead of aiming to generalize at the level of events, 
critical realism methodology aims for theoretical description of mechanisms 
and structures to explain observed events. But how do we identify 
mechanisms, since they are not observable? Bhaskar states: “Theoretical 
explanation proceeds by description of significant features, retroduction to 
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
93 
 
possible causes, elimination of alternatives and identification of the generative 
mechanism or causal structure at work” (Bhaskar 1998, p. xvii). This is the 
retroduction technique—taking the empirical data and finding a mechanism 
that might explain the events (Danermark 2002; Sayer 2000).  
 
As there is no established methodology for identifying mechanisms, some key 
steps that together may provide the basis for a consistent methodology were 
applied. These were the six steps and principles for conducting a critical realist 
data analysis provided by Danermark et al. (2002) and Bygstad & Munkvold 
(2011):  
 
1) Description of events  
2) Identification of key components  
3)Theoretical re-description (abduction)  
4) Retroduction: Identification of candidate mechanisms  
5) Analysis of selected mechanisms and outcomes  
6) Concretization and contextualization  
 
As regards the first step of identifying the events, this has been done in the 
introduction (Chapter 1) and in the respective papers. The second step, 
identification of key components, which are the real objects of the case, e.g. 
persons, organizations and systems (Bygstad & Munkvold 2011), has been 
implemented in the unit of analysis and the buyer-supplier relationships 
embedded in the theoretical framework. Step three, theoretical re-description 
(abduction), is where the data analysis begins. We need to abstract the case, 
exploring different theoretical perspectives and explanations to be able to 
work with retroduction (Danermark et al., 2002). Danermark et al. (2002) 
suggests that relevant theories should be identified, compared and integrated 
when possible to be able to understand the events and to increase theoretical 
sensitivity. In this step, interpretation and re-describing aspects from different 
conceptual frameworks and theories about structures and relations are in play. 
Here, the objects of the study are developed within new contexts of ideas 
(Danermark et al. 2000). This has been done in each paper by coding the 
activities and researching the supplier sustainability compliance issue and 
several different theoretical interpretations and explanations in each paper. 
Just by pursuing critical realism, it is possible to “use perceptions of empirical 
events [those that can be observed or experienced] to identify the mechanisms 
that give rise to those events” (Volkoff et al. 2007, p. 835). During this 
process, several mechanisms emerged and are thus analyzed in the papers. 
The mechanisms include governance structures (see paper 2), distributive 
justice (see paper 3) and relational norms (see paper 4). This fits well with the 
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fact that different mechanisms can cause the same events (Sayer 2000). 
Volkof et al. (2007) states that step four, the retroduction step, is the most 
crucial, although steps 3 and 4 are closely related in research practice. In this 
step, the question is asked or the research problems reformulated to ask: 
Which mechanisms explain supplier sustainability compliance, non-
compliance and challenges? In each paper, the individual mechanisms are 
analyzed in relation to structures and relations interpreted in step three. The 
analysis of selected mechanisms and outcomes from the papers (step five) is 
implemented in the overall discussion in the cover of this thesis. Here, the 
relative explanatory powers of the mechanisms and structures described in the 
papers are elaborated and estimated (Danermark et al. 2002). The final step 
that completes the analysis according to critical realism is concretization and 
contextualization. This step is present within the overall discussion and 
conclusion of the thesis. Here, it is explained how the different structures and 
mechanisms are concretized based on actual cases. Also, contextualization is 
provided by explaining the limitations and managerial implications. 
 
3.2.6. QUALITY IN A CASE STUDY 
 
In this section, the quality criteria applied to the study will be outlined. It has 
been argued that “high quality research must use the most rigorous research 
methods possible” (Flynn 2008, p. 66). The conventional tests or criteria for 
evaluating methodological rigor are construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity, and reliability (Guba 1981; Yin 2003). These four criteria 
apply to both quantitative and qualitative research (Ellram 1996; Mentzer & 
Flint 1997; Yin 2003). However, these conventional concepts of validity 
change in the face of critical realism (Zachariadis et al. 2013). The four 
concepts are followed in this thesis from a critical realism perspective to 
ensure the quality of the research effort. The validity criteria, according to 
critical realism, are illustrated in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14: Validity based on a critical realist approach, adapted from 
Zachariadis et al. (2013). 
 
In critical realism, construct validity refers to whether the empirical data 
collected under the research conditions are empirical traces of the actual 
events of interest that are purportedly caused by the generative mechanisms 
(Johnston & Smith 2010, p. 33). Construct validity in this study has been 
attained by interviewing the suppliers themselves, using a relevant interview 
protocol in an industry where actual events such as challenges with 
sustainability compliance are evident.  By doing this, the thesis provides 
evidence regarding the mechanisms that underlie non-compliance, 
compliance and compliance challenges with regard to sustainability. Ensuring 
high construct validity is a pre-requisite for internal and, ultimately, external 
validity (Modell, 2009). Reliability is closely tied to construct validity (Ellram 
1996) and in a qualitative study, reliability is more an account of all the 
methodological choices rather than of reproducibility. In critical realism, 
reliability is an essential part of the retroductive process and the identification 
of contingent factors (Zachariadis et al. 2013). In this study, reliability has 
been achieved through the above elaboration of the methodological choices 
and specifically by the explanation of the retroductive process. 
 
Internal validity or the credibility of the causal explanations (Modell 2009) 
means, according to critical realism, establishing that the events that occur in 
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the actual domain are caused by the generative mechanisms uncovered and 
proposed by the theory; this is done by explaining and confirming that the 
mechanisms have operated as described (Johnston & Smith 2010; Modell 
2009). Internal validity establishes a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions (Yin 2003). This internal 
validity becomes evident in the papers by tracing the generative mechanisms 
through the data coding activities. Hereby, the generative mechanisms, which 
are responsible for or cause the actual events, are indirectly detected in the 
empirical traces and not only through theorizing (Johnston & Smith 2010). In 
this study, part of the research was explanatory; here, the internal validity was 
increased by performing a thorough review of the relevant literature (see 
literature review paper 1). Furthermore, in the analysis, the emergent 
mechanisms were tied to the existing literature to enhance the internal 
validity, generalizability and theoretical level of theory building from case 
study research (Eisenhardt 1989). Eisenhardt (1989, p.542) states: “It is 
important to discover the underlying theoretical reasons for why the 
relationship exists. This helps to establish the internal validity of the 
findings.”  
 
External validity concerns establishing the domain to which a study´s findings 
can be generalized (Yin 2003). Furthermore, external validity refers to 
whether findings are generalizable across persons, settings and time, although 
it is somewhat unclear whether the case study approach is able to honor these 
quality criteria (Aastrup & Halldórsson 2008). Overall, qualitative analyses 
have a poorer external validity than quantitative analyses. According to 
critical realism, “generalizations are valid when we are confident that similar 
or other events that arise (or may arise) in other contexts are caused by the 
same generative mechanisms that led to the actual events in our research 
domain” (Zachariadis et al. 2013, p. 7). In this study, external validity has 
been achieved by using analysis strategies that can also be used in similar 
cases. External validity has also been obtained by interviewing a variety of 
supplier companies (large and small, public and private, old and new) (Flint 
& Golicic 2009). However, it is also clear that external validity could be 
enhanced and the generalizability of the findings could be determined by 
looking at other industries and other countries, and by repeating the same 
procedures in similar cases to see whether the same result is obtained (Yin 
2003). 
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CHAPTER 4. SUMMARY OF PAPERS 
The four papers enclosed in full-text versions in an appendix are not public 
available in order not to violate the publishers’ copyright. The following 
presents a brief outline of the four included papers of this dissertation. 
 
Paper 1 – Normann, U. (2013) 
________________________________________________________ 
 
What are Buying Companies Doing to Influence Suppliers to Act Sustainable? 
Paper presented at the 18th IFPSM Summer School, Salzburg, Austria. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
This paper presents a literature review providing an overview and analysis of 
how the mechanisms adopted by buying companies to influence suppliers to 
live up to sustainability requirements affect supplier sustainability 
performance. The review includes 53 papers ranging  to spring 2013. The aim 
of the paper is to generate an overview of the sustainability governance 
mechanisms emphasized in the sustainable-sourcing literature and to 
understand why some of these mechanisms, frequently those most prevalent 
among buying companies, are ineffective, and it lays the grounds for 
pinpointing valuable future research areas. 
 
The review identified evidence of 14 mechanisms used by buying firms to 
create supplier sustainability performance/compliance. The four most 
prevalent mechanisms are discussed in the paper, and the 10 remaining, are 
briefly described. 
 
Analysis of the four sustainability-governance mechanisms reveals that the 
actual performance regarding supplier sustainability performance is difficult 
to spot in the reviewed papers as performance in the papers is described as 
compliance or noncompliance. Furthermore, it was not clear in many of the 
articles if the current performance was the result of one of the four 
mechanisms or a combination with some of the other 10 mechanisms found. 
 
A reasons for this uncertainty about sustainable performance of suppliers 
might be that the majority of the articles are written with a focus on the buying 
companies and that the majority of the empirical studies also have been done 
with a focus on the buying company. 
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Paper 2 -  Normann, U. (2015) 
_____________________________________________________________ 
 
Sustainability Exchange Governance in the Textile and Apparel Industry: 
Why Do the Suppliers Find It Hard to Comply with the Buying Companies 
Sustainability Requirements? 
Paper presented at the 24th Annual IPSERA Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands. 
 
Keywords: Exchange governance, Sustainability, Supplier perspective 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
In this empirically based paper, which presents an explorative multiple-case 
study, the aim is to reach a better understanding of which governance 
structures are applied in the exchanges between buying companies and 
suppliers in the Textile and Apparel Industry to ensure supplier sustainability 
compliance. A multiple-case study with 30 supplier interviews in India, 
Bangladesh, and China was undertaken. 
 
The study in this paper reached the conclusion that by asking the suppliers 
themselves how they perceive the sustainability requirements from the buying 
companies, a deeper comprehension of the noncompliance reasons appeared. 
 
From this qualitative study, we confirm that the contractual governance 
structure is the dominant way used by buying companies and furthermore that 
sustainability compliance is not obvious or easy for suppliers. The findings 
show that the suppliers are acting opportunistically. Evidence of five 
conceivable categories and subcategories that might influence the ability of 
supplier sustainability compliance was identified in the analysis of the data. 
The five categories were financial, codes of conduct/standards/audit, 
cooperation, no perceived fairness regarding buying companies’ sustainability 
requirements, and no requirements re sustainability from buying companies. 
 
This knowledge or comprehension of the supplier situation could be used to 
advantage by buying companies, especially in relation to small suppliers, to 
avoid opportunism. 
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Paper 3 - Normann, U., Ellegaard, C. and Møller, M.M. (2016) 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Supplier Perceptions of Distributive Justice in Sustainable Apparel Sourcing.  
Submitted to and in final review process with International Journal of Physical 
Distribution and Logistics Management. A previous version was presented at the 31st 
Annual IMP Conference 2015, Kolding, Denmark. 
 
Keywords: Sustainable sourcing, assessment governance, distributive justice, textile 
industry, qualitative study. 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
This paper has two purposes. First, it tries to determine whether suppliers 
perceive distributive justice when customer companies require sustainability 
based on assessment governance such as the use of codes of conduct and 
audits. Second, the paper gives insight into specific supplier-perceived costs, 
rewards, and investment, and how these combined create equity. 
 
A qualitative research design was adopted for this study. Thirty executives 
from textile manufacturing suppliers in China, India, and Bangladesh were 
interviewed to determine their perceptions of distributive justice in relation to 
their key customers’ sustainable-sourcing requirements. 
 
The data show that customers’ assessment governance based on codes of 
conduct and auditing frequently leads to supplier perceptions of distributive 
injustice. Four types of suppliers are identified based on their varying 
perceptions of the equity equation. 
 
The findings introduce distributive justice as an important mediating variable 
between assessment-based governance and compliance. They also provide 
insights into the different types of perceived costs, rewards, and investments 
connected to sustainable sourcing, and how they form different varieties of 
the equity equation. The findings rely on a limited number of respondents and 
must, therefore, be researched further. 
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Paper 4 - Normann, U. (2016) 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Inconsistent Norms in Buyer-Supplier Relations – A Study of Sustainability 
Introduction in the Textile and Apparel Industry. 
Paper presented at the 32nd Annual IMP Conference in Poznan, Poland.  Special 
invitation to IMM special edition 2017. 
 
Keywords: Norms, Relational exchange, Sustainability exchange, Qualitative Study 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
The purpose of this paper is to consider the set of norms present in the textile 
industry and to see how this set of norms has changed over time. This paper 
explores the set of norms governing the relational exchange between suppliers 
and buying companies. Moreover, it explores the changes to these norms 
brought about by the introduction of sustainability requirements. Thirty 
suppliers/manufacturers in the textile and apparel industry in India, 
Bangladesh, and China were interviewed to shed light on how the introduction 
of sustainability requirements from buyers has affected the applied exchange 
norms. 
 
In the analysis of the data, evidence of seven norms was found. To find the 
gap emerging in the set of found norms because of sustainability-related 
requirements, findings of each of the norms were elaborated. 
 
Based on the findings, it can be concluded that there is a growing gap between 
the preexisting set of norms governing the buyer–supplier relationship and the 
set of norms developing in relation to sustainability issues. The findings 
revealed that the buying companies are combining transactional and 
relational-based governance but without considering existing norms and 
mutual agreements with suppliers. This gap or deviation in the buying 
companies’ set of norms is causing frustration with the suppliers, which might 
affect the buyer–supplier relationship and may impede the possibility of 
supplier sustainability compliance. 
 
For future research, the findings should be tested in other industries and 
possibly other countries and cultures. 
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
The purpose and aim of this dissertation are to contribute to an understanding 
of the governance structures and mechanisms employed by buying companies 
in connection with sustainability initiatives that affect suppliers and their 
relationship with the buying companies. This chapter will outline how this 
purpose and the objectives are reached in this dissertation, and each research 
problem will be discussed together with the contribution from the 
accompanying papers. 
 
5.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM 1 
 
What governance structures and governance mechanisms are used by 
buying companies to achieve supplier sustainability compliance and how do 
these governance structures and governance mechanisms affect the supplier 
sustainability compliance? 
 
To illuminate how buying companies’ governance structures/mechanisms 
affect suppliers and their compliance with sustainability, it is important first 
to uncover the specific governance structures and mechanisms applied by the 
buying company to achieve the desired supplier sustainability compliance. In 
addition, the effects of these governance structures/mechanisms on suppliers 
are to be examined. Starting out on this investigation it was found suitable 
first to make a systematic review of the literature. The review in Normann 
(2013, denoted Paper 1) was focused specifically on sustainable-sourcing 
governance mechanisms and their effects as laid out in the literature. A 
broader review of the literature appears in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. 
 
The literature study in Paper 1 revealed 14 governance mechanisms as being 
the most used by buying companies in their effort at influencing suppliers to 
comply with sustainability. Four of these mechanisms were dominant and 
were the ones analyzed in Paper 1. The four mechanisms were 1) codes of 
conduct (COC), 2) standards and certifications, 3) audits and monitoring, and 
4) collaboration and supplier involvement. These four governance 
mechanisms are each applied to different governance structures; the first three 
mechanisms, COC, certifications/standards, and audits/monitoring, are, as 
mentioned previously, control- or assessment-based governance mechanisms 
(Gimenez & Sierra 2012; Krause et al. 2009). The last governance 
mechanism, collaboration/supplier involvement, is relational and informal 
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(see the further outline of the two different sustainability-related governance 
structures in 2.1.2). 
 
Overall, the review shows that the COC does not always have the desired 
performance effect, which is supported by multiple authors (e.g., Carter & 
Rogers 2008; Lee & Kim 2009; Lim & Phillips 2008; Welford & Frost 2006). 
In addition, it seems that the performance effect of standards and certificates 
may be limited in some areas, and at the same time, this mechanism causes 
high economic costs (Ciliberti et al. 2008; Stigzelius & Mark-herbert 2009). 
The greatest performance effect is seen in the green and environmental areas, 
where measurement of performance is easier (Chen 2005; Klassen & Vachon 
2003). Monitoring/audits are among the most frequent mechanisms in the 
literature study, however, often without discussing compliance or 
noncompliance in relation to this sustainable governance mechanism. 
Nevertheless, it could be derived from a significant part of the literature (e.g., 
Boyd et al. 2007; Egels-Zandén 2007; Jiang 2009; Lee & Kim 2011; Pedersen 
& Andersen 2006), that the emergence of many problems and challenges are 
in the context of audits and monitoring. The largest positive performance 
effect is caused by the sustainability-governance mechanism 
collaboration/supplier involvement. In addition, most studies of 
collaboration/supplier involvement show that the greatest effect is on the 
green and environmental performance areas, with lesser effects on the social 
aspects (Gimenez & Sierra 2012; Klassen & Vachon 2003; Large & Thomsen 
2011; Lee & Klassen 2008; Theyel 2001). As the assessment-based 
governance structure is the most widely used by buying companies, this 
governance structure was specifically explored in Normann et al. and 
Normann (2015, 2016, 2015, also denoted Papers 2, 3, and 4). 
 
Paper 1 and the review in Chapter 2 provide a detailed overview of the 
sustainable-sourcing literature and insights into the most common 
sustainability-governance mechanisms applied by buying companies, as well 
as an overview of the challenges associated with buying companies’ use of 
these sustainability-governance mechanisms in relation to achieving 
sustainability compliance. In addition, the results from the literature review in 
Paper 1 show that the actual performance effect of the various sustainability-
governance mechanisms applied by buying companies is severely doubtful. 
 
The contributions from the analysis of research problem 1 and Paper 1 are 
 
• An overview of the different types of sustainability-related 
governance mechanisms applied by buying companies. 
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• An overview of the sustainable-sourcing literature addressing 
sustainability-governance mechanisms. 
• An overview of why the four most common sustainability-related 
governance mechanisms do not work particularly well in terms of 
achieving sustainability supplier compliance. 
 
5.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM 2 
 
How do suppliers perceive the present sustainability related governance 
structures and governance mechanisms utilized by buying companies and 
what impact do the sustainability governance structures and governance 
mechanisms have on the buyer-supplier relationship?? 
 
Papers 2, 3, and 4 answer this question. When inquiring into how supplier 
sustainability compliance can be achieved, it is necessary to go beyond 
discussing the sustainability-governance structures and mechanisms applied 
by buying companies. Suppliers’ opinions and perceptions of these buyer 
requirements and efforts must also be explored to get an understanding of their 
effects. It is particularly important to know something about suppliers’ 
perception of the assessment-based sustainability-governance structure as this 
is the dominant governance structure used by buying companies trying to 
achieve supplier sustainability compliance (Gimenez & Tachizawa 2012). 
Finally, it is important to know what effect these supplier perceptions have on 
the relationship between buyer and supplier and what implications this may 
have for supplier sustainability compliance. 
 
Suppliers’ perceptions of the assessment-based sustainability-governance 
structure and its individual governance mechanisms were analyzed in this 
dissertation. It appears overall that this assessment-based governance 
structure may have important implications for the suppliers’ ability and 
willingness to comply. The three papers that analyze suppliers’ perceptions 
(Papers 2, 3, and 4), have different angles on the supplier perception of this 
governance structure. A general perception by suppliers is that they frequently 
feel pressure and unfairness from assessment initiatives, which can lead to 
opportunistic supplier behavior or noncompliance. 
 
Based on the suppliers’ perception of the assessment-based governance 
structure and based on the research question “why do suppliers find it hard to 
comply with the buying companies’ sustainability requirements?” Paper 2 
reveals three categories that answer this question. The three categories are, 1) 
Financial implications that may influence suppliers’ ability to comply, 2) 
Supplier perceptions of assessment-based governance mechanisms that may 
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influence supplier compliance, and 3) Supplier perception of the influence of 
cooperation on compliance. The financial category showed that the suppliers 
felt let down by the buying companies because of lacking contribution, e.g., 
payment of higher prices for sustainability. The suppliers’ perception of the 
category applied assessment-based governance mechanism COC, certificates, 
and monitoring showed that suppliers were frustrated about the large number 
of different COCs they were presented with from different customers and the 
huge number of resulting audits. The category cooperation shows that 
suppliers are of the opinion that buying companies are not doing much to 
cooperate with them as the purchaser only has an eye for the product and price 
aspects and totally ignores the sustainability-related difficulties that actually 
cause the suppliers major challenges. 
 
Paper 3 shows that noncompliance may also be caused by suppliers’ 
perceptions of distributive justice. This feeling of unfairness and act of 
opportunistic behavior are caused from the suppliers’ experience of an 
imbalance in the distribution of costs, rewards, and investments related to the 
assessment initiatives promoted by buying companies. Most suppliers in this 
study experience that their costs greatly exceed the rewards they receive and 
that customer costs and investments are minimal in comparison. This causes 
a sense of distributive injustice in relation to the sustainability-related 
initiatives taking place between suppliers and buying companies. 
 
Paper 4 shows that suppliers perceive that the norm-set present in the 
relationship seems to have changed, probably also triggered by the 
introduction of the assessment-based governance approach. Previously, only 
one norm-set existed in the relational product exchange, whereas today we are 
experiencing two parallel norm-sets. Suppliers are experiencing a large 
deviation and gap between these two norm-sets. Suppliers perceive that the 
buying companies have one relational norm-set in the case of product-related 
exchanges and a more assessment-based norm-set in the case of the 
sustainability-associated requirements. Suppliers, on the other hand, are 
looking at requirements for the product and sustainability as a total in the 
exchange. Suppliers are baffled and frustrated facing this deviation, as buying 
companies appear differentiated in their behavior when coordinating product 
exchange and sustainability activities. This supplier-perceived shift in norms 
and the finding that suppliers with sustainability activities follow the 
“original” relational norms and buying companies follow the more 
assessment-based norms can also be the cause of opportunistic behavior, 
anger, and frustration, which is backed up in the literature, for example, by 
Boyd et al. (2007), Ivens (2006), and Tähtinen and Blois (2011). Ivens (2006) 
states that deviation from expected behavior and violation of norms may lead 
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to opportunistic behavior and distrust and form the basis for conflict among 
parties in a relational exchange. 
 
Together, we see in Papers 2, 3, and 4 that the assessment-based governance 
structure and applied governance mechanisms have an impact on the buyer–
supplier relationship. Buying companies mainly use assessment-based 
governance structure for sustainability activities, which leads to a critical and 
negative attitude from the suppliers and problems realizing the desired goal 
of supplier sustainability compliance. This inadequacy of the assessment-
based governance structure is also noted by Rai et al. (2012) and Cannon et 
al. (2000), who state that using contractual measures alone is not sufficient 
and that they create uncertainty in the relationship. The results of the 
imbalance in the equity equation are frustration, anger, and lack of trust, and 
thus negativity in the relationship. At the same time, the progressed deviation 
in the norm-set, from being exclusively based on relational norms to having 
moved toward more assessment-based norms also has resulted in confusion 
and frustration among suppliers, influencing the relationship. The negative 
impact of the assessment-based governance structure is on the relationship 
between suppliers and buying companies, which in turn can have an impact 
on supplier sustainability compliance. Suppliers point out many times in this 
study that they find buying companies’ methods and the results of these to be 
unfair. This perception can greatly affect the possibility for sustainability 
compliance. In connection to supply chain initiatives, Frazier et al. (1988) 
state that the fairer a deal (initiative) is, the higher the chances for success. 
There is also little development of mutual expectations in the relationship 
regarding the sustainability-related requirements stipulated by the buying 
companies, which results in suppliers’ lack of willingness to comply. The 
literature also shows that the misalignment of expectations in the relationship 
may lead to exactly those supplier reactions seen from the data. Dwyer et al. 
(1987), Ring and van de Ven (1992, 1994), and Frazier et al. (1988) express 
that parties who are willing to discuss expectations have a greater possibility 
of a good relationship. 
 
In connection with research problem 2, Papers 2, 3, and 4 contribute to the 
overall sustainable-sourcing literature by 
 
• showing why the assessment-based governance structure and its 
applied governance mechanisms might not work, by examining 
some factors that may work against it, such as the perception of 
distributive justice and the perception of norm-set deviation. 
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• involving the distributive justice concept, which has not been done 
in the extant sustainable-sourcing literature. Distributive justice is a 
mediating variable that can help explain the negative effects 
resulting from assessment-based governance. 
 
• documenting the gap in the norm-sets and norm deviation 
experience by suppliers in connection to sustainable sourcing. 
 
• empirically verifying that there is a good reason to look at the 
underlying motives for supplier sustainability noncompliance. 
 
• taking a supplier perspective of the motives for sustainability 
noncompliance. Most of the empirical studies in the literature 
investigate the buying companies’ perception of efforts in 
implementing supplier sustainability activities (Boyd et al. 2007). 
 
The overall contribution of the four papers shows that in the first place, the 
underlying possible causes of suppliers’ inability to comply with 
sustainability should be found. Here, it is crucial to explore how suppliers 
perceive the requirements placed on them by buying companies. Second, the 
perception of distributive injustice and norm deviation affect the relationship 
and hence the possibility of sustainability compliance, which means that the 
relationship will play a crucial role with respect to the suppliers’ sustainability 
compliance. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS 
This Ph.D. dissertation has investigated sustainable sourcing. Specifically, it 
focuses on the mechanisms underlying the suppliers’ inability and lack of 
willingness to comply with sustainability. Focus has also been on how these 
mechanisms affect the relationship between buying companies and their 
suppliers and how the development of the relationship may be contributing to 
sustainability compliance. This is achieved by pursuing the two research 
problems: 
 
1. What governance structures and governance mechanisms are used by 
 buying companies to achieve supplier sustainability compliance and 
 how do these governance structures affect suppliers’ sustainability 
 compliance? 
 
2. How do suppliers perceive the present sustainability related governance 
 structures and governance mechanisms utilized by buying companies 
 and what impact do the sustainability governance structures and 
 governance mechanisms have on the buyer-supplier relationship? 
 
The focus of the sustainable-sourcing literature has been on governance 
structures and the associated governance mechanisms and the effects of these, 
mainly on different types of performance measures. The literature provides 
answers to how both assessment-based governance structures and 
collaboration-based governance structures can lead to sustainability 
compliance. However, the studies also reveal that performance effects are 
mainly realized on the environmental side, with less success on the social 
responsibility side. It seems that major challenges regarding suppliers’ 
sustainability compliance remain. Furthermore, most sustainable-sourcing 
studies are based on buying companies’ perspectives. This dissertation 
expands on this view by stipulating that there are some underlying 
mechanisms that affect supplier sustainability compliance. The starting point 
is the suppliers’ perception of buying companies’ use of assessment-based 
governance. 
 
By looking at the suppliers’ perception of the applied assessment-based 
governance structure, it has been possible to explore mechanisms such as 
norms and equity. By drawing on relational exchange theory, the supplier 
perception of norm-set deviation and distributive injustice is addressed as an 
explanation for supplier noncompliance with sustainability. The theoretical 
chapter of this dissertation presents an overview of the theoretical foundation 
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of the four papers and the overall dissertation. In addition to sustainable 
sourcing, sustainability governance, governance structures, relational norms, 
and distributive justice, the theoretical section also includes a section about 
relationships and relationship development. The result of the lacking supplier 
compliance due to the assessment-based governance structure is emphasized 
by the theoretical concepts distributive justice and relational norms. At the 
same time, the theoretical concepts of relationships underline the importance 
of the development of a buyer–supplier relationship as an initiator in 
connection with suppliers’ ability and opportunity for sustainability 
compliance. Overall, this dissertation contributes to the sustainable-sourcing 
literature by providing a literature overview of buying companies applied 
sustainability-governance structures and mechanisms and their ability to lead 
to compliance. Furthermore, it contributes to the sustainable-sourcing 
literature by involving the distributive justice and relational norm concepts 
and the concepts’ influence on the relationship and thereby the supplier 
sustainability compliance. 
 
6.1. PRACTICAL AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
It is very important for buying-company managers to recognize and embrace 
the concept of sustainability in their business (Kumar & Christodoulopoulou 
2014) and in that connection to ensure supplier sustainability compliance. 
 
The four papers contribute differently in this dissertation. First, Papers 1 and 
2 show the buying companies’ management why the assessment-based 
governance structure does not work. Then, the management, by reading 
Papers 3 and 4, get suggestions on why this governance structure does not 
work. 
 
Buying-company managers must be aware of the gap between the original 
product-oriented norm-set and the norm-set that also exists in connection with 
sustainability-oriented activities. They must be aware that they cannot isolate 
sustainability from the rest of the business—thus creating two norm-sets. By 
doing so, they can damage the relationship, as two norm-sets confuse 
suppliers. It is, therefore, important for buying-company managers to 
understand that they must treat product exchange together with sustainability 
requirements. 
By this attention and an understanding of the effect such a gap has on the 
relationship and thus on supplier compliance, buying-company managers 
would be able to work with suppliers to develop the relationship for the 
desired sustainability compliance. 
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Furthermore, important to buying-company managers is an understanding of 
the possible uneven distribution of costs, rewards, and investments that are 
currently taking place in connection with the assessment governance 
approach, and which contributes to suppliers’ inability to achieve 
sustainability compliance. Buying-company managers should take supplier 
perceptions of distributive justice into their deliberations when they require 
sustainability compliance, as it has an impact on the desired supplier 
compliance. Through closer cooperation and a stronger relationship, they 
should agree on expectations for supplier sustainability compliance. Buying-
company managers should take more responsibility for the suppliers’ side of 
the business if they want compliance. 
 
Overall, buying-company managers, and especially the buyers who are in 
contact with suppliers, should collaborate more directly with suppliers, in 
parallel with running assessment-based governance mechanisms and thus by 
a stronger relationship develop suppliers toward sustainability compliance. 
 
6.2. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Even though the supplier perspective is very important for this study, it will 
be interesting for future researchers to examine supplier sustainability 
compliance from a dual perspective and thus also examine the buying 
companies’ perceptions on issues like the assessment-based governance 
approach, the supplier experienced deviation in norm-sets, and the concept of 
distributive justice in connection with sustainability activities. 
 
In addition, an important aspect in relation to suppliers’ perception and their 
ability to achieve sustainability compliance would be to look at the cultural 
differences that are present in the three countries from which the empirical 
data were derived. The textile industry in China, Bangladesh, and India has 
been targeted for data collection in this dissertation. It would be interesting 
for future research to do similar studies in several different industries and 
other countries. 
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